CVE-2026-73416 — jupyterlab
Fix: jupyterlab/jupyterlab@9365f02CVE-2026-73416 is a CWE-178 vulnerability in jupyterlab. A fix is available for jupyterlab — see the affected versions and patch details below.
jupyterlab: PyPI extension blocklist package-name canonicalization bypass
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-73416.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
jupyterlab🐍jupyterlabReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
JupyterLab's PyPI extension manager enforces blocked_extensions_uris by comparing the requested install name to blocklist entries with a custom string normalization that is weaker than PyPI package-name canonicalization. An authenticated user can request a PyPI-equivalent spelling such as JupyterLab.Git for a blocklisted package such as jupyterlab-git; JupyterLab accepts the install request even though pip resolves the variant to the same package.
This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:
- an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;
- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and
- kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)
Impact
The vulnerability lets an authenticated user install a package the operator specifically intended to block, defeating the allowlist/blocklist control. Because extensions in principle allow for arbitrary code execution, this vulnerability enables untrusted users to impact the integrity and availability of the jupyter-server instance that was provisioned to them. The user already has access to their own single-user server's data, so installing an extension grants no new read access.
In particular, the integrity of data can be impacted, and any hardening or restrictions on permitted user actions (download/upload limits) within the single-user server can be circumvented. Availability impact on a JupyterHub deployment is limited: while a user can be expected to exhaust their own kernel pod's resources, this vulnerability makes it easier to also exhaust the single-user server resources or generate more requests to shared resources; where limits are absent, resource exhaustion could potentially degrade the wider deployment.
Patches
JupyterLab v4.6.2 and v4.5.10 contain the patch.
Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.
Workarounds
No action is required for deployments that do not have a custom allow/block list configured. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:
--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly
or the following traitlet:
c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'
You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:
<img width="293" height="293" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f" />Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | jupyterlab | ≥ 4.6.0&&< 4.6.2 | 4.6.2pip install --upgrade 'jupyterlab==4.6.2' |
| 🐍PyPI | jupyterlab | ≥ 4.5.0&&< 4.5.10 | 4.5.10pip install --upgrade 'jupyterlab==4.5.10' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jupyterlab, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update jupyterlab to 4.6.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73416 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
A Moderate impact flaw in JupyterLab's PyPI extension manager allows an authenticated user to bypass extension blocklists. This is due to weak package-name canonicalization, enabling the installation of prohibited extensions by using alternative spellings. This affects the integrity and availability of JupyterLab…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-73416 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-73416 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.