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CVE-2026-102904 — jupyterlab

MEDIUMFix: jupyterlab/jupyterlab@a274a82

CVE-2026-102904 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) CWE-88 vulnerability in jupyterlab. A fix is available for jupyterlab — see the affected versions and patch details below.

JupyterLab: Argument injection in JupyterLab extension uninstall exposes server-readable files and internal URLs

Also known asBIT-jupyterlab-2026-102904GHSA-3325-v43h-43rvPYSEC-2026-4055
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-102904.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs10th percentile — riskier than 10% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.47%0.71%0.2%0.2%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-102904 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐍jupyterlab🐍jupyterlab

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

JupyterLab's PyPI extension manager runs python -m pip uninstall with the extension name taken from the request body. ExtensionHandler.post validates the name for cmd=install but not for cmd=uninstall, so a name that begins with - reaches the command line and pip reads it as an option rather than as a package.

cmdline = [
    sys.executable,
    "-m",
    "pip",
    "uninstall",
    "--yes",
    "--no-input",
    extension,
]

An extension name of the form -r followed by a path therefore made pip open that path as a requirements file. pip's parse error quotes the line it could not read and names the file it came from, and JupyterLab returned that error in the response body, so the line reached the requester.

This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:

  • the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled, so that uninstall requests reach pip;
  • an authenticated account permitted to call the extension API; and
  • kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts (otherwise a user with kernel access can read the same files and make the same outbound requests directly, regardless of this endpoint)

Unlike GHSA-37w4-hwhx-4rc4 and GHSA-89vp-jrxv-24w8, this does not need an allowlist or blocklist to be configured. The uninstall path never consulted the listing.

Impact

An authenticated user gains a read of server-side files and an outbound request from the server, both outside the confinement that the contents root and the disabled kernels were meant to provide. The user cannot choose which line of a file is returned, and cannot write content of their choosing.

Reading files the account cannot reach

-r<path> makes pip open the path as a requirements file. The first line that pip cannot parse as a requirement comes back in the response together with the path. Blank lines and # comments are skipped. A line that is a valid package name is accepted silently, and the request answers 201 with no message, so a secret made only of letters, digits, dots, hyphens and underscores is not disclosed. One line is returned per request, and the requester cannot select which one.

The same option distinguishes a missing path ([Errno 2] No such file or directory), an unreadable one ([Errno 13] Permission denied) and a directory ([Errno 21] Is a directory), so any path on the host can be probed for existence and readability.

Reaching hosts and ports the account cannot reach

-r also accepts a URL. pip fetches it with an ordinary GET from the server's network position and reflects the first unparsable line of the response body the same way. A response whose body is a single line comes back in full. In a deployment where the single-user server sits inside a private network, this reaches internal services and cloud instance metadata endpoints that the user has no other route to.

Writing files

--log=<path> makes pip create that file if it is absent and append its own log to it otherwise. The content is pip's log text, not text the requester chooses, so the effect is to create files at chosen paths and to corrupt a file that has to parse, such as a configuration file read at the next start.

What this does not add

The same endpoint already uninstalls any installed package when it is given an ordinary, valid package name, so the injection adds no availability impact beyond what the extension manager already permits. Deployments that treat that as unacceptable should use the read-only extension manager, as described below.

pip refuses --python after a subcommand name, and ignores editable entries in an uninstall requirements file, so neither gives code execution.

Patches

JupyterLab v4.6.4 and v4.5.11 contain the patch. The uninstall name is now validated as a PyPI package name in both the HTTP handler and PyPIExtensionManager.uninstall, and the pip command line carries an explicit -- before the package operand.

Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.

Workarounds

Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation and removal entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:

--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly

or the following traitlet:

c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'

You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:

<img width="293" height="293" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f" />

Users lose the ability to install and remove extensions from the Extension Manager; extensions must then be installed by an administrator in the environment.

Note: an egress policy that blocks outbound requests from the single-user server limits the reach of the URL variant, but does not address the file read or the file write.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIjupyterlab≥ 4.6.0&&< 4.6.44.6.4pip install --upgrade 'jupyterlab==4.6.4'
🐍PyPIjupyterlab≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.5.114.5.11pip install --upgrade 'jupyterlab==4.5.11'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jupyterlab, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update jupyterlab to 4.6.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-102904 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

A moderate-impact argument injection flaw in JupyterLab affects Red Hat OpenShift AI, which ships the vulnerable JupyterLab releases in its workbench and distributed-workload notebook images, and the Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.1 solution server image, which also ships JupyterLab. When JupyterLab processes an…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Upstream provides a workaround: deployments can disable programmatic extension installation and removal entirely by switching JupyterLab to the read-only extension manager, either by starting the server with the `--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly` command-line option or by setting the traitlet `c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'` in the JupyterLab configuration file. Because exploitation requires an authenticated account able to call the extension API, restricting extension API access to trusted accounts also reduces exposure. This issue is fixed upstream in JupyterLab 4.5.11 and 4.6.4; the fix for the affected Red Hat OpenShift AI components is deferred, so the read-only extension…
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-102904 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

JupyterLab's PyPI extension manager runs `python -m pip uninstall` with the extension name taken from the request body. `ExtensionHandler.post` validates the name for `cmd=install` but not for `cmd=uninstall`, so a name that begins with `-` reaches the command line and pip reads it as an option rather than as a package. ```python cmdline = [ sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "uninstall", "--yes", "--no-input", extension, ] ``` An extension name of the form `-r` followed by a path therefore made pip open that path as a requirements file. pip's parse error quotes the lin
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-102904: jupyterlab — Fixed in 4.6.4