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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-63746 — surrealdb

MEDIUM

CVE-2026-63746 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in surrealdb. A fix is available for surrealdb — see the affected versions and patch details below.

SurrealDB: Graph traversal bypasses table SELECT permissions

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-63746.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs32th percentile — riskier than 32% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-63746 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 391,411 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀surrealdb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

An authenticated record or scope user could read records on any table reachable through a graph edge or REFERENCES TO back-reference, regardless of that table's PERMISSIONS FOR select clause.

Traversing SELECT * FROM source->edge->target returned full documents from target even when target was defined as PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE. The same bypass extended through multi-hop chains, so any table reachable by a sequence of edges from a readable starting point was exposed.

The root cause: GraphEdgeScan and ReferenceScan fetched records straight from storage without routing them through Document::pluck_select, so the target table's permission expression was never consulted.

Impact

An authenticated record or scope user can read records on any table reachable through a chain of graph edges or back-references from a table they have select on, regardless of the target's PERMISSIONS FOR select clause. Confidentiality-only and bounded to the caller's current database — namespace and database isolation are unaffected.

Patches

A new per-batch permission cache (exec::permission::CachedTableSelect) resolves each target table's SELECT permission once and filters yielded values through check_permission_for_value, matching the regular SELECT code path.

  • Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.

Workarounds

  • Remove select permission on edge tables whose targets should be hidden.
  • Use namespace or database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosurrealdball versions3.1.0cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
surrealdbsurrealdb
< 3.1.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update surrealdb to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-63746 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.

Frequently Asked Questions

An authenticated record or scope user could read records on any table reachable through a graph edge or `REFERENCES TO` back-reference, regardless of that table's `PERMISSIONS FOR select` clause. Traversing `SELECT * FROM source->edge->target` returned full documents from `target` even when `target` was defined as `PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE`. The same bypass extended through multi-hop chains, so any table reachable by a sequence of edges from a readable starting point was exposed. The root cause: `GraphEdgeScan` and `ReferenceScan` fetched records straight from storage without routing them
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-63746 in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-63746: surrealdb — Fixed in 3.1.0