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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-56821 — netty-handler-ssl-ocsp

HIGH

CVE-2026-56821 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.4) CWE-299 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty: Out-of-date OCSP Responses Accepted by OcspServerCertificateValidator

Also known asGHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-56821.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs12th percentile — riskier than 12% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.48%0.72%0.1%0.2%0.2%0.2%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-56821 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp☕io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

OcspServerCertificateValidator flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as VALID, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate.

Details

In io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered the freshness check has no return, so execution falls through and a VALID OcspValidationEvent is still fired:

                        if (!(current.after(response.getThisUpdate()) &&
                                current.before(response.getNextUpdate()))) {
                            ctx.fireExceptionCaught(new IllegalStateException("OCSP Response is out-of-date"));
                        }

Nonce validation is optional and off by default, so freshness is the only replay defense — and it is not enforced. Additionally getNextUpdate() may be null, making current.before(null) throw NullPointerException.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960#section-3.2

   5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be
      correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent;

   6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will
      be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is
      greater than the current time.

PoC

Add the test below to io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidatorTest

    @Test
    void staleOcspResponseIsRejected() throws Exception {
        X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()
                .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
                .subject("CN=TrustedRootCA")
                .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
                .buildSelfSigned();

        GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, "http://localhost/");
        AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(
                new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));
        X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()
                .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
                .subject("CN=TargetServer")
                .addExtensionOctetString("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", false, aia.getEncoded())
                .buildIssuedBy(caRoot);

        Date past = new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() - TimeUnit.DAYS.toMillis(7));
        CertificateID certId = new CertificateID(
                new JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder().build().get(CertificateID.HASH_SHA1),
                new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()),
                targetCert.getCertificate().getSerialNumber());
        BasicOCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new BasicOCSPRespBuilder(
                new RespID(new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()).getSubject()));
        respBuilder.addResponse(certId, CertificateStatus.GOOD, past, past);
        BasicOCSPResp expiredBasicResp = respBuilder.build(
                new JcaContentSignerBuilder("SHA256withRSA").build(caRoot.getKeyPair().getPrivate()),
                new X509CertificateHolder[0],
                past);
        final byte[] responseEncoded = new OCSPRespBuilder()
                .build(OCSPRespBuilder.SUCCESSFUL, expiredBasicResp).getEncoded();

        IoTransport defaultTransport = createDefaultTransport();
        IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(defaultTransport.eventLoop(), () -> {
                NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();
                channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {
                    @Override
                    public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress,
                                        SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {
                        promise.setSuccess();
                        ctx.executor().execute(() -> {
                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();
                            DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(
                                    HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK,
                                    Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));
                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, "application/ocsp-response");
                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH,
                                    httpResponse.content().readableBytes());
                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);
                        });
                    }
                });
                return channel;
            }, defaultTransport.datagramChannel());

            SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder
                    .forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(),
                            targetCert.getCertificate(), caRoot.getCertificate())
                    .build();
            Channel serverChannel = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));
                        }
                    })
                    .bind(0).sync().channel();

            int serverPort = ((InetSocketAddress) serverChannel.localAddress()).getPort();

            AtomicBoolean validEventFired = new AtomicBoolean();
            AtomicReference<Throwable> caughtException = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);
            SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()
                    .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
                    .build();
            new Bootstrap()
                    .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), "127.0.0.1", serverPort));
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(
                                    new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                @Override
                                public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {
                                    if (evt instanceof OcspValidationEvent &&
                                            ((OcspValidationEvent) evt).response().status() ==
                                                    OcspResponse.Status.VALID) {
                                        validEventFired.set(true);
                                    }
                                    ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);
                                }

                                @Override
                                public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                    caughtException.compareAndSet(null, cause);
                                    ctx.channel().close();
                                    latch.countDown();
                                }
                            });
                        }
                    })
                    .connect("127.0.0.1", serverPort).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
            assertFalse(validEventFired.get(),
                    "OcspValidationEvent(VALID) must not be emitted for a stale OCSP response");
            assertNotNull(caughtException.get());
            assertInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class, caughtException.get());

            serverChannel.close().sync();
            resolver.close();
    }

Impact

Certificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using OcspServerCertificateValidator is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.16.Final4.2.16.Finalio.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp:4.2.16.Final
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocspall versions4.1.136.Finalio.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp:4.1.136.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.0 && < 4.2.16
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp to 4.2.16.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-56821 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

Moderate: The `netty-handler-ssl-ocsp` component, integrated into Red Hat products, is affected by an improper certificate revocation check within its OCSP stapling validator. This flaw could enable an attacker to successfully employ revoked certificates, bypassing detection and potentially compromising the security…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-56821 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `OcspServerCertificateValidator` flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as `VALID`, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate. ### Details In `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered` the freshness check has no `return`, so execution falls through and a `VALID` `OcspValidationEvent` is still fired: ```java if (!(current.after(response.getThisUpdate()) &&
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-56821: netty-handler-ssl — Fixed in 4.2.16.Final