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Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checksGHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x

GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is a security vulnerability in app-store-server-library. A fix is available for app-store-server-library — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍app-store-server-library

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.

As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIapp-store-server-library≥ 0.2.0&&< 3.1.23.1.2pip install --upgrade 'app-store-server-library==3.1.2'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for app-store-server-library, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update app-store-server-library to 3.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `SignedDataVerifier` attempts to perform online revocation checking when `enable_online_checks=True`, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale `GOOD` responses as valid indefinitely. In `appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py`, `_ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status()` verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by `producedAt`, `thisUpdate`, or `nextUpdate`. As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP `GOOD` response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifie…