How severe is GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x?

GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x affects the following packages: app-store-server-library (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x?

Update app-store-server-library to 3.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for app-store-server-library. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x was published on July 13, 2026 and was last updated on July 14, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x

Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checks

Published

Jul 13, 2026

Updated

Jul 14, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍app-store-server-library

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.

As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`app-store-server-library`	≥ 0.2.0&&< 3.1.2	3.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for app-store-server-library. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update app-store-server-library to 3.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `SignedDataVerifier` attempts to perform online revocation checking when `enable_online_checks=True`, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale `GOOD` responses as valid indefinitely. In `appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py`, `_ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status()` verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by `producedAt`, `thisUpdate`, or `nextUpdate`. As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP `GOOD` response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x in your dependencies?

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