CVE-2026-55512 — nebula-mesh

Summary

When OIDC is enabled, GET /ui/oidc/login is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for 10m. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore grow OIDC.states for the full state TTL, bounded by request throughput rather than by configured auth rate limits.

Details

The OIDC login route is registered directly by WithOIDC:

• internal/web/web.go:153 registers w.router.Get("/ui/oidc/login", o.HandleLogin).
• internal/web/web.go:154 rate-limits only GET /ui/oidc/callback with w.rateLimitMiddleware("auth").

The normal /ui/* route group applies rate limiting to login/register form submissions, but this direct registration happens outside that group:

• internal/web/web.go:287 through internal/web/web.go:292 show the rate-limited local login, TOTP, and register POST routes.

The OIDC login handler allocates persistent server-side state before redirecting to the configured identity provider:

• internal/web/oidc.go:105 defines HandleLogin.
• internal/web/oidc.go:106 creates a random state token.
• internal/web/oidc.go:112 calls o.rememberState(state).
• internal/web/oidc.go:122 redirects to o.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state).

The state storage has a TTL but no maximum size:

• internal/web/oidc.go:24 through internal/web/oidc.go:26 define oidcStateTTL = 10 * time.Minute.
• internal/web/oidc.go:353 through internal/web/oidc.go:358 sweep expired states and then add the new state to o.states.
• internal/web/oidc.go:360 through internal/web/oidc.go:373 delete only expired states.

Because the route is unauthenticated and not rate-limited, a remote client can repeatedly request /ui/oidc/login and force live state entries to accumulate for ten minutes. OIDC must be enabled for exposure. No IdP callback, valid credentials, or user interaction is required to trigger the allocation.

Affected version evidence: OIDC login support was introduced by commit 3f46685 (feat(auth): add OIDC operator login (Keycloak/Authentik/Okta/...) (#24)), and git tag --contains 3f46685 --sort=version:refname returns v0.2.0 and every later release through v0.3.8. Pattern checks across all release tags showed the OIDC login route and state allocation are present in v0.2.0 and in every v0.3.x release from v0.3.0 to v0.3.8, and absent from v0.1.x. The current checkout at commit d92dd9a60de291e2bc1caf73b4e9a99567b31ec0 (git describe: v0.3.8-1-gd92dd9a) remains affected.

PoC

Safe local PoC run from a clean checkout at commit d92dd9a60de291e2bc1caf73b4e9a99567b31ec0 on 2026-06-12. The PoC is a temporary Go test that uses httptest and an in-memory OIDC object; it does not start a real server, does not contact an IdP, and uses 1000 requests only to demonstrate linear state growth.

1. Create a temporary test file internal/web/security_audit_poc_test.go in package web.
2. Create a test Web UI with newTestWeb(t).
3. Install a deliberately tiny auth rate limiter: group auth with rate 0.001 and burst 2.
4. Attach an OIDC instance with an empty states map and an oauth2.Config whose authorization endpoint is https://idp.example.test/auth.
5. Send 1000 unauthenticated GET /ui/oidc/login requests from the same RemoteAddr through w.ServeHTTP.
6. Assert no request returns 429 Too Many Requests, then inspect o.stateCount().

Command run:

go test ./internal/web -run 'TestSecurityAuditPOC' -count=1 -v

Observed vulnerable output from this environment:

=== RUN   TestSecurityAuditPOC_OIDCLoginAllocatesUnrateLimitedState
POC_OIDC_STATE_GROWTH attempts=1000 live_states=1000 ttl=10m0s rate_limit_group=auth_burst_2
--- PASS: TestSecurityAuditPOC_OIDCLoginAllocatesUnrateLimitedState (0.10s)

The meaningful control is that local login/register/TOTP POST routes and the OIDC callback are rate-limited: internal/web/web.go:287 through internal/web/web.go:292 and internal/web/web.go:154. The PoC specifically shows the OIDC login allocation route does not share that protection. After recording the output, the temporary test file was removed and git status --short returned clean. The PoC was re-run after drafting this report and produced the output shown above.

Impact

In deployments with OIDC enabled, an unauthenticated remote client can cause application-layer memory growth by repeatedly requesting /ui/oidc/login. Each request stores a new state entry for ten minutes, and the growth is not bounded by the configured auth rate limiter or by a maximum map size. The demonstrated impact is availability degradation risk through retained in-memory state growth. The PoC used 1000 local requests to avoid disruptive load while proving the source-to-sink behavior (1000 requests resulted in 1000 live states).

Suggested remediation: apply the existing auth rate limiter to GET /ui/oidc/login, add a maximum number of live OIDC states per client and/or globally, and fail closed when the cap is reached. Add a regression test that attaches a low-burst auth limiter, sends repeated GET /ui/oidc/login requests from the same client, and expects 429 or bounded live-state count after the configured burst.