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CVE-2026-53604 — nebula-mesh

Fix: forgekeep/nebula-mesh@1f1ab9a

CVE-2026-53604 is a CWE-212 vulnerability in github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh. A fix is available for github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh — see the affected versions and patch details below.

nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths

Also known asGHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5GO-2026-5984
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs7th percentile — riskier than 7% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.68%0.2%0.2%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The web handler renderMobileBundle (internal/web/handlers.go:1325) passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build (internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54), resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56, 62, 68, 80, 86, 92, 98, 102, 109, 118, 150).

As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh.

The API handler (internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:74) already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected.

This is the same key-zeroization class previously addressed in GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v.

Patches

Add defer caMgr.Wipe() inside mobilebundle.Build immediately after the LoadByID call so every caller (web and API) is protected on all return paths. Ensure CAManager.Wipe() is idempotent, since the API handler also wipes the same manager.

Workarounds

None at the configuration level; requires a code fix.

Resources

  • internal/web/handlers.go:1325
  • internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54
  • internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:74 (correct reference implementation)
  • Prior related advisory: GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/forgekeep/nebula-meshall versions0.3.8go get github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh@v0.3.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh to 0.3.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-53604 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact The web handler `renderMobileBundle` (`internal/web/handlers.go:1325`) passes the real `*pki.CAResolver` directly into `mobilebundle.Build`. Inside `Build` (`internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54`), `resolver.LoadByID` decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a `*pki.CAManager`, but `Build` never calls `CAManager.Wipe()` on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56, 62, 68, 80, 86, 92, 98, 102, 109, 118, 150). As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the **web** UI and `Build` returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB erro
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-53604: nebula-mesh — Fixed in 0.3.8