CVE-2026-54556 — http4s-ember-core_2.12
Fix: http4s/http4s@6e8eccdCVE-2026-54556 is a CWE-409 vulnerability in org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12. A fix is available for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Http4s: HTTP/2 Denial of Service with Ember Backend
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54556.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
http4s 0.23.x and 1.0 servers running ember with http2 enabled are vulnerable to a denial of service attack using a HPACK bomb vulnerability recently disclosed as affecting other http2 servers.
Impact
Denial of Service:
- Affects any http4s server running the ember backend with HTTP/2 enabled that is exposed to untrusted traffic.
- Affects any http4s client running the ember backend with HTTP/2 enabled that can be directed to an untrusted server.
Details
The issue occurs in the Hpack wrapper. Ember concatenates the header and continuation frames before decoding all headers at once. When the code decodes the attack payload, the relatively small packets decode to a significantly larger amount of data which is returned as a single List which is then held in memory for further processing. With enough concurrent connections (~5 with a 2GB heap in testing) this leads to an OOM, eg:
java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.scala$collection$mutable$ListBuffer$$freshFrom(ListBuffer.scala:129)
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:147)
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:40)
at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq(Growable.scala:69)
at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq$(Growable.scala:69)
at scala.collection.mutable.AbstractBuffer.$plus$plus$eq(Buffer.scala:314)
at org.http4s.Header$.org$http4s$Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$_$$lessinit$greater$$anonfun$2(Header.scala:192)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$Lambda/0x00001fe001239c50.apply(Unknown Source)
at scala.collection.immutable.List.foreach(List.scala:334)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10.<init>(Header.scala:192)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$.scalaCollectionSeqToRaw(Header.scala:195)
at org.http4s.Headers$.apply(Headers.scala:220)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.PseudoHeaders$.headersToRequestNoBody(PseudoHeaders.scala:95)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream.receiveHeaders$$anonfun$1$$anonfun$2$$anonfun$3$$anonfun$2(H2Stream.scala:248)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream$$Lambda/0x00001fe001511fd8.apply(Unknown Source)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.runLoop(IOFiber.scala:429)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.autoCedeR(IOFiber.scala:1460)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.run(IOFiber.scala:129)
at cats.effect.unsafe.WorkerThread.run(WorkerThread.scala:935)
Fix
The Hpack handling code has a configurable max header size parameter, but it does not include indexed headers in that accounting, allowing the attack to bypass the limit. There is not any configuration available in current http4s versions that can be enabled to prevent this attack short of disabling http2.
A fix has been tested locally that threads the maxHeaderSize setting from the server builder into the Hpack code. Using this, connections can be prematurely terminated once the decoded data size exceeds the maxHeaderSize that users can already configure.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade immediately:
- Disable HTTP/2 in Ember backends
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12 | all versions | 0.23.35org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12:0.23.35 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13 | ≥ 1.0.0-M1&&< 1.0.0-M47 | 1.0.0-M47org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13:1.0.0-M47 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3 | all versions | 0.23.35org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3:0.23.35 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3 | ≥ 1.0.0-M1&&< 1.0.0-M47 | 1.0.0-M47org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3:1.0.0-M47 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13 | all versions | 0.23.35org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13:0.23.35 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12 to 0.23.35 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54556 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-54556 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.