CVE-2026-45726 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.6) Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/siderolabs/omni. A fix is available for github.com/siderolabs/omni — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-45726.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-45726 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 390,807 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/siderolabs/omni🐹github.com/siderolabs/omniReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters.
During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported.
If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster.
Severity
- Attack Vector: Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys.
- Attack Complexity: High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API.
- Privileges Required: Low: the role
Readeris sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - User Interaction: Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist.
- Scope: Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni.
- Confidentiality Impact: High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed.
- Integrity Impact: High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it.
- Availability Impact: High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it.
Impact
- Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters).
- With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including
system:masters, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/siderolabs/omni | ≥ 1.3.0&&< 1.6.6 | 1.6.6go get github.com/siderolabs/omni@v1.6.6 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/siderolabs/omni | ≥ 1.7.0&&< 1.7.3 | 1.7.3go get github.com/siderolabs/omni@v1.7.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siderolabs/omni, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.6.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-45726 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-45726 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.