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CVE-2025-59824 — omni

Fix: siderolabs/omni@a5efd81

CVE-2025-59824 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/siderolabs/omni. A fix is available for github.com/siderolabs/omni — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Omni Wireguard SideroLink potential escape

Also known asGHSA-hqrf-67pm-wgfqGO-2025-3979
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-59824.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.01%
Lower risk than most CVEs11th percentile — riskier than 11% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.47%0.71%0.0%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/siderolabs/omni

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Overview

Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access.

In this setup, Omni assigns a random IPv6 address to each Talos machine from a /64 network block. Omni itself uses the fixed ::1 address within that same block.

From Omni's perspective, this is a WireGuard interface with multiple peers, where each peer corresponds to a Talos machine. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the source IP address of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it performs no validation on the packet's destination address.

The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface.


Impact

This vulnerability creates two distinct attack scenarios based on Omni's IP forwarding configuration.

  1. IP Forwarding Disabled (Default) If IP forwarding is disabled, an attacker on a Talos machine can send packets over SideroLink to any listening service on Omni itself (e.g., an internal API). If Omni is running in host networking mode, any service on the host machine could also be targeted. While this is the default configuration, Omni does not enforce it.

  2. IP Forwarding Enabled If IP forwarding is enabled, an attacker on a Talos machine can communicate with other machines connected to Omni or route packets deeper into Omni's network. Although this is not the default configuration, Omni does not check for or prevent this state.

Patches

The problem has been fixed in Omni >= 0.48.0, the commit is https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/commit/a5efd816a239e6c9e5ea7c0d43c02c04504d7b60

Workarounds

Disable IP forwarding, implement strict firewall rules.

References

None

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/siderolabs/omniall versions0.48.0go get github.com/siderolabs/omni@v0.48.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
omnisiderolabs
< 0.48.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siderolabs/omni, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/siderolabs/omni to 0.48.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-59824 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Overview Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access. In this setup, Omni assigns a random IPv6 address to each Talos machine from a `/64` network block. Omni itself uses the fixed `::1` address within that same block. From Omni's perspective, this is a WireGuard interface with multiple peers, where each peer corresponds to a Talos machine. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the **source IP address** of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Ta
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2025-59824: omni — Fixed in 0.48.0