CVE-2026-35040 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-440 vulnerability in fast-jwt. A fix is available for fast-jwt — see the affected versions and patch details below.
fast-jwt: Stateful RegExp (/g or /y) causes non-deterministic allowed-claim validation (logical DoS)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-35040.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-35040 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
fast-jwtnpmDescription
Impact
Using certain modifiers on RegExp objects in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options in verify functions can cause certain unintended behaviours. This is because some modifiers are stateful and will cause failures in every second verification attempt regardless of the validity of the token provided.
Such modifiers are:
- /g : Global matching
- /y : Sticky matching
This does NOT allow invalid tokens to be accepted, only for valid tokens to be improperly rejected in some configurations. Instead it causes 50% of valid authentication requests to fail in an alternating pattern, leading to:
- Intermittent user authentication failures
- Potential retry storms in applications
- Operational monitoring alerts
Affected Configurations
This vulnerability ONLY affects applications that:
- Use RegExp objects (not strings) in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options
- Use stateful RegExp modifiers such a /g or /y
Example: allowedAud: /abc/g ← IMPACTED Example: allowedAud: "/abc/" ← SAFE
Not Affected
- Applications using string patterns for audience validation (most common)
- Applications using RegExp patterns without stateful modifiers
Assessment Guide
To determine if you're affected:
Check if allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options use RegExp objects (/pattern/ or new RegExp()) If yes, review the pattern for stateful modifiers like /g, /y If no RegExp usage or no stateful modifiers, you are NOT affected
Mitigation Options
While a fix will be coming in the next version of the package you can take steps to mitigate the issue immediately by removing any such modifiers (/g, /y) from the regex.
Summary
fast-jwt accepts RegExp for allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, and allowedNonce.
If the provided regular expression uses the g (global) or y (sticky) flag, verification becomes non-deterministic: the same valid token alternates between acceptance and rejection across successive calls.
This occurs because RegExp.prototype.test() is stateful when g/y is set (it mutates lastIndex), and fast-jwt reuses the same RegExp object without resetting lastIndex.
Affected component
src/verifier.js
ensureStringClaimMatcher() returns the RegExp object directly.
validateClaimValues() performs repeated a.test(v) calls without resetting lastIndex.
Impact
Logical denial-of-service / authentication flapping.
A valid signed JWT can be intermittently rejected.
Causes unpredictable authentication outcomes across repeated verification calls.
Can trigger retry storms and cascading failures in API gateways and authentication middleware.
Affects any deployment that configures allowed* using RegExp and includes g or y flags.
Root cause
validateClaimValues() uses: allowed.some(a => a.test(v))
When a is a RegExp with g or y, a.test() mutates a.lastIndex.
Subsequent calls against the same input can return different results.
Proof of concept
Environment
- fast-jwt: 6.1.0 (repo HEAD)
- Node.js: v24.13.1
PoC const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const sign = createSigner({ key: 'secret' }) const token = sign({ aud: 'admin', iss: 'issuer' })
function run(name, opts) { const verify = createVerifier({ key: 'secret', ...opts }) console.log('\n==', name) for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) { try { verify(token); console.log(i, 'PASS') } catch (e) { console.log(i, 'FAIL', e.code || e.message) } } }
run('allowedAud global regex', { allowedAud: /^admin$/g }) run('allowedIss global regex', { allowedIss: /^issuer$/g }) run('control (non-global regex)', { allowedAud: /^admin$/ })
Observed behavior
- allowedAud with
/galternates PASS/FAIL across calls - allowedIss with
/galternates PASS/FAIL across calls - control regex (no g/y) is deterministic and always PASS
Expected behavior
Validation must be deterministic.
The same token under the same verifier configuration must always yield the same decision.
Suggested fix (minimal and safe)
Wrap RegExp matchers inside ensureStringClaimMatcher() to reset lastIndex before calling test(): if (r instanceof RegExp) { return { test: v => { r.lastIndex = 0; return r.test(v) } } }
This preserves semantics for non-global regexes, makes g/y deterministic, and avoids changes in the rest of the verifier logic.
Security classification
Logical DoS / authentication reliability failure.
This can be weaponized to produce production outages via retry storms and auth instability.
Why this is not “misuse”
- The library explicitly accepts RegExp for allowed* claim validation.
- The behavior difference is caused by internal state mutation of RegExp.test().
- The same token, same verifier config, same runtime yields different outcomes.
- Security decisions must be deterministic; non-determinism at the verification layer is a correctness flaw.
- Consumers cannot reliably defend against this unless the library normalizes matcher state.
Notes
- Affects allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, allowedNonce equally (shared matcher logic).
- Independent from the previously reported ReDoS; this is a determinism and correctness failure that can still produce production DoS effects.
PoC Code: 'use strict'
/**
- PoC: Stateful RegExp flags (g/y) cause non-deterministic allowed-claim validation
- fast-jwt reuses the same RegExp object; RegExp.test() mutates lastIndex when g/y is set.
- This script prints a human-readable log AND writes evidence to JSON.
- Usage:
- node poc_regex_state_evidence.js */
const fs = require('node:fs') const path = require('node:path') const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const OUT_JSON = path.join(process.cwd(), 'evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.json') const OUT_LOG = path.join(process.cwd(), 'evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.log')
// Make a stable, valid token const sign = createSigner({ key: 'secret' }) const token = sign({ aud: 'admin', iss: 'issuer', sub: 'subject', jti: 'id-123', nonce: 'nonce-xyz' })
function runCase(name, verifierOpts, iterations = 12) { const verify = createVerifier({ key: 'secret', ...verifierOpts })
const results = [] for (let i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { try { verify(token) results.push({ i, ok: true }) } catch (e) { results.push({ i, ok: false, code: e.code || null, message: e.message || String(e) }) } }
return results }
function summarize(results) { const seq = results.map(r => (r.ok ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL')).join(' ') const pass = results.filter(r => r.ok).length const fail = results.length - pass return { pass, fail, seq } }
function printCase(name, opts, results) {
const s = summarize(results)
const lines = []
lines.push(== ${name})
lines.push(opts: ${JSON.stringify(opts)})
lines.push(PASS=${s.pass} FAIL=${s.fail})
lines.push(sequence: ${s.seq})
lines.push('')
return lines.join('\n')
}
function main() { const meta = { poc: 'stateful-regexp-allowed-claims', package: 'fast-jwt', node: process.version, timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), note: 'RegExp.test is stateful when g/y flags are set; lastIndex mutation causes alternating PASS/FAIL.' }
// Cases: g/y should flap, control should be stable const cases = [ { name: 'allowedAud with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedAud: /^admin$/g } }, { name: 'allowedAud with sticky RegExp /y (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedAud: /^admin$/y } }, { name: 'allowedIss with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedIss: /^issuer$/g } }, { name: 'allowedSub with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedSub: /^subject$/g } }, { name: 'allowedJti with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedJti: /^id-123$/g } }, { name: 'allowedNonce with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedNonce: /^nonce-xyz$/g } }, { name: 'CONTROL: allowedAud with non-global RegExp (expected: stable PASS)', opts: { allowedAud: /^admin$/ } } ]
const evidence = { meta, token: { alg: 'HS256 (autodetected by fast-jwt)', signed: true, jwt: token }, cases: [] }
let log = '' for (const c of cases) { const results = runCase(c.name, c.opts, 12) const s = summarize(results)
evidence.cases.push({
name: c.name,
opts: c.opts,
iterations: results.length,
pass: s.pass,
fail: s.fail,
sequence: s.seq,
results
})
log += printCase(c.name, c.opts, results)
}
fs.writeFileSync(OUT_JSON, JSON.stringify(evidence, null, 2)) fs.writeFileSync(OUT_LOG, log)
console.log(log)
console.log([+] Wrote JSON evidence: ${OUT_JSON})
console.log([+] Wrote LOG evidence : ${OUT_LOG})
}
main()
Output: PS C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt> node .\poc_regex_state_evidence.js == allowedAud with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedAud":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedAud with sticky RegExp /y (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedAud":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedIss with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedIss":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedSub with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedSub":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedJti with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedJti":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedNonce with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedNonce":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == CONTROL: allowedAud with non-global RegExp (expected: stable PASS) opts: {"allowedAud":{}} PASS=12 FAIL=0 sequence: PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
[+] Wrote JSON evidence: C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt\evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.json [+] Wrote LOG evidence : C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt\evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.log PS C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt>
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | fast-jwt | all versions | 6.2.1npm install fast-jwt@6.2.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fast-jwt, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update fast-jwt to 6.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-35040 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-35040 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-35040. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-35040 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-35040 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.