GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw
uutils coreutils: cp/install/mv/ln --suffix alone does not enable backup mode (silent data loss vs GNU)
Blast Radius
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Description
determine_backup_mode in src/uucore/src/lib/features/backup_control.rs only checks --backup/-b and returns BackupMode::None when only --suffix is given. GNU enables backup mode when --suffix is used alone (defaulting to existing/numbered, or $VERSION_CONTROL). Affects cp, install, mv, ln which share this code.
# uutils: no backup created
$ coreutils cp --suffix=.bak src dest # dest.bak NOT created
# GNU: dest.bak created
$ cp --suffix=.bak src dest
Impact: users/scripts relying on --suffix to back up a file before overwrite get silent data loss; breaks GNU compatibility across four utilities. Recommendation: enable backup mode when --suffix is present.
Note: this is primarily a GNU-compatibility/data-safety divergence rather than a classic exploitable vulnerability — review whether it warrants a CVE.
Remediation: Acknowledged by Canonical; fixed in PR #9741 (uucore: use --suffix to enable backup mode), commit 939ab037a, merged 2025-12-21. determine_backup_mode now has a --suffix-alone branch that resolves the mode from $VERSION_CONTROL (defaulting to existing). Released in uucore 0.6.0 and later (vulnerable: < 0.6.0). Regression tests added in the same file: test_backup_mode_suffix_without_backup_option and test_backup_mode_suffix_without_backup_option_with_env_var.
Reported by Zellic in the uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment (prepared for Canonical, Jan 20 2026), audited commit 3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242. Finding 3.7. Credit: Zellic.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | uucore | all versions | 0.6.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for uucore. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update uucore to 0.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.