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CVE-2026-26267

HIGH

rs-soroban-sdk #[contractimpl] macro calls inherent function instead of trait function when names collide

Also known asGHSA-4chv-4c6w-w254
Published
Feb 19, 2026
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk23th percentile+0.27%
0.00%0.27%0.54%0.82%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🦀soroban-sdk-macros🦀soroban-sdk-macros🦀soroban-sdk-macros

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Prior to versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1, the #[contractimpl] macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls. #[contractimpl] generates code that uses MyContract::value() style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function. This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously: First, an impl Trait for MyContract block is defined with one or more functions, with #[contractimpl] applied. Second, an impl MyContract block is defined with one or more identically named functions, without #[contractimpl] applied. If the trait version contains important security checks, such as verifying the caller is authorized, that the inherent version does not, those checks are bypassed. Anyone interacting with the contract through its public interface will call the wrong function. The problem is patched in soroban-sdk-macros versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1. The fix changes the generated call from <Type>::func() to <Type as Trait>::func() when processing trait implementations, ensuring Rust resolves to the trait associated function regardless of whether an inherent function with the same name exists. Users should upgrade to soroban-sdk-macros 22.0.10, 23.5.2, or 25.1.1 and recompile their contracts. If upgrading is not immediately possible, contract developers can avoid the issue by ensuring that no inherent associated function on the contract type shares a name with any function in the trait implementation. Renaming or removing the conflicting inherent function eliminates the ambiguity and causes the macro-generated code to correctly resolve to the trait function.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosoroban-sdk-macros25.0.0&&< 25.1.125.1.1
🦀crates.iosoroban-sdk-macros23.0.0&&< 23.5.223.5.2
🦀crates.iosoroban-sdk-macrosall versions22.0.10

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for soroban-sdk-macros. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update soroban-sdk-macros to 25.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-26267 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-26267 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-26267. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Prior to versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1, the `#[contractimpl]` macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls. `#[contractimpl]` generates code that uses `MyContract::value()` style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function. This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously: First, an `impl Trait for MyContract` block is de
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-26267 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-26267 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.