CVE-2026-26267 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-670 vulnerability in soroban-sdk-macros. A fix is available for soroban-sdk-macros — see the affected versions and patch details below.
rs-soroban-sdk #[contractimpl] macro calls inherent function instead of trait function when names collide
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-26267.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-26267 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
soroban-sdk-macros🦀soroban-sdk-macros🦀soroban-sdk-macrosReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The #[contractimpl] macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls.
In Rust, you can define functions on a type in two ways:
- Directly on the type as an inherent function:
impl MyContract { fn value() { ... } } - Through a trait
impl Trait for MyContract { fn value() { ... } }
These are two separate functions that happen to share the same name. Rust has rules for which one gets called. When you write MyContract::value(), Rust always picks the one defined directly on the type, not the trait version.
The bug is that #[contractimpl] generates code that uses MyContract::value() style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function.
This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously:
- A
impl Trait for MyContractblock is defined with one or more functions, with#[contractimpl]applied. - A
impl MyContractblock is defined with one or more identically named functions, without#[contractimpl]applied.
If the trait version contains important security checks, such as verifying the caller is authorized, that the inherent version does not, those checks are bypassed. Anyone interacting with the contract through its public interface will call the wrong function.
For example:
#[contract]
pub struct Contract;
impl Contract {
/// Inherent function — returns 1.
/// Bug: The macro-generated WASM export is wired up to call this function.
pub fn value() -> u32 {
1
}
}
pub trait Trait {
fn value(env: Env) -> u32;
}
#[contractimpl]
impl Trait for MyContract {
/// Trait implementation — returns 2.
/// Fix: The macro-generated WASM export should call this function.
fn value() -> u32 {
2
}
}
Patches
The problem is patched in soroban-sdk-macros version 25.1.1. The fix changes the generated call from <Type>::func() to <Type as Trait>::func() when processing trait implementations, ensuring Rust resolves to the trait associated function regardless of whether an inherent function with the same name exists.
Users should upgrade to soroban-sdk-macros >= 25.1.1 and recompile their contracts.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, contract developers can avoid the issue by ensuring that no inherent associated function on the contract type shares a name with any function in the trait implementation. Renaming or removing the conflicting inherent function eliminates the ambiguity and causes the macro-generated code to correctly resolve to the trait function.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | soroban-sdk-macros | ≥ 25.0.0&&< 25.1.1 | 25.1.1cargo update -p soroban-sdk-macros --precise 25.1.1 |
| 🦀crates.io | soroban-sdk-macros | ≥ 23.0.0&&< 23.5.2 | 23.5.2cargo update -p soroban-sdk-macros --precise 23.5.2 |
| 🦀crates.io | soroban-sdk-macros | all versions | 22.0.10cargo update -p soroban-sdk-macros --precise 22.0.10 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for soroban-sdk-macros, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update soroban-sdk-macros to 25.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-26267 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-26267 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-26267. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-26267 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-26267 across crates.io dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.