CVE-2026-22871 — guarddog
Fix: DataDog/guarddog@9aa6a72CVE-2026-22871 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in guarddog. A fix is available for guarddog — see the affected versions and patch details below.
GuardDog Path Traversal Vulnerability Leads to Arbitrary File Overwrite and RCE
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-22871.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
guarddogReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability exists in GuardDog's safe_extract() function that allows malicious PyPI packages to write arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Remote Code Execution on systems running GuardDog.
CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
Details
Vulnerable Code
File: guarddog/utils/archives.py
elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):
with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip:
for file in zip.namelist():
# Note: zip.extract cleans up any malicious file name
# such as directory traversal attempts This is not the
# case of zipfile.extractall
zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file)) # ❌ VULNERABLE
Root Cause
The comment about zip.extract() fooled me at first :) then I noticed the os.path.join() call.
The vulnerability stems from incorrect usage of Python's zipfile.ZipFile.extract() API:
- The
pathparameter should be the target directory, not a full file path extract()automatically appends the member name to the path- By passing
os.path.join(target_directory, file), GuardDog causes the filename to be appended twice - This breaks zipfile's built-in path traversal sanitization
Attack Vector
- Attacker creates malicious wheel with path traversal filenames
- Uploads to PyPI or distributes directly
- Package scan:
guarddog pypi scan malicious-pkg - GuardDog downloads and extracts the package
- Malicious files written to arbitrary locations
- Code execution could be achieved
Impact
Impact depends on how GuardDog is running and under which environment.
Critical Scenarios
-
Immediate Code Execution
- Write to
~/.bashrc→ executes on next shell - Write to
~/.profile→ executes on login
- Write to
-
Persistent Backdoors
- Write to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys→ SSH access - Write to
/etc/cron.d/malicious→ scheduled execution (if root) - Write to systemd user services → persistent execution
- Write to
and more...
Credits
Reported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | guarddog | all versions | 2.7.1pip install --upgrade 'guarddog==2.7.1' |
Affected Products
guarddogdatadoghqDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for guarddog, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update guarddog to 2.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-22871 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-22871 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.