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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-62331 — praktor

HIGHFix: mtzanidakis/praktor@c3731ee

CVE-2026-62331 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor. A fix is available for github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor — see the affected versions and patch details below.

praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection

Also known asGHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-62331.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs56th percentile — riskier than 56% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.28%0.61%0.94%1.28%0.8%0.8%Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (praktor-wk-<workspace>, mounted at /workspace/agent), escaping the documented uploads/ directory.

The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (internal/telegram/bot.go, at both upload sites) and resolved with path.Join, which collapses ../ sequences. A filename like ../../../CLAUDE.md resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside uploads/.

Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside uploads/ lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. CLAUDE.md, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under /workspace/agent. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).

Reachability

By default the bot has no user allowlist (allow_from: [] means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.

Affected versions

Through v0.9.0 (and HEAD 3902d29).

Patched versions

v0.9.1, containing PR #228.

Workarounds

Restrict telegram.allow_from to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to v0.9.1 is the recommended fix.

Fix (defense in depth)

  • internal/telegram/bot.go: apply path.Base() to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and ...
  • internal/container/manager.go: WriteVolumeBytes now rejects any path that escapes /vol after path.Join, protecting future callers.

Credit

Reported privately by tonghuaroot, who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real container.Manager, and fix verification.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/mtzanidakis/praktorall versions0.9.1go get github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor@v0.9.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor to 0.9.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-62331 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk-<workspace>`, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory. The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`. Because the agent workspace i
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-62331: praktor Path Traversal — Fixed in 0.9.1