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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-126355 — hono

MEDIUMFix: honojs/hono@bf16471

CVE-2026-126355 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in hono. A fix is available for hono — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Hono: `csrf()` does not check requests sent by hyperlink auditing (`text/ping`)

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 12, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

7Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
hononpm
104.6Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

csrf() validates a request only when its Content-Type is one of the three types an HTML form can send. Chromium's hyperlink auditing (<a ping>) sends a cross-origin POST with the user's cookies and the content type text/ping, which is not in that list. The middleware does not look at Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site for such a request, so it is passed to the handler.

Details

The middleware skips the origin check when the content type is not one that a form submission produces. The assumption was that any other content type requires a CORS preflight and therefore cannot be sent cross-origin with credentials. Hyperlink auditing is an exception: Chrome and Edge send the ping as a credentialed POST without a preflight, with a fixed body and Content-Type: text/ping.

A page on another origin can therefore trigger a POST to any URL of the application. The csrf() options for origin and secFetchSite do not change the outcome, because neither header is evaluated for the request.

The request body is fixed, so only actions whose effect does not depend on the body can be triggered. Firefox does not send pings by default. As with any CSRF, the user's cookie must be sent with the request, which with the default SameSite=Lax means a same-site origin or a cookie set with SameSite=None.

Impact

A user who visits a malicious page in Chrome or Edge while logged in to an application protected by csrf() can be made to send a state-changing request to that application, such as logging out, deleting a resource, or toggling a setting that is selected by the path or query string.

This issue affects applications that rely on csrf() as their CSRF protection and expose state-changing endpoints whose effect does not depend on the request body.

Workarounds

Reject requests with a Content-Type of text/ping in a middleware registered before csrf(), or set session cookies with SameSite=Strict.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhonoall versions4.13.16npm install hono@4.13.16

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update hono to 4.13.16 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-126355 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `csrf()` validates a request only when its `Content-Type` is one of the three types an HTML form can send. Chromium's hyperlink auditing (`<a ping>`) sends a cross-origin POST with the user's cookies and the content type `text/ping`, which is not in that list. The middleware does not look at `Origin` or `Sec-Fetch-Site` for such a request, so it is passed to the handler. ### Details The middleware skips the origin check when the content type is not one that a form submission produces. The assumption was that any other content type requires a CORS preflight and therefore cannot b
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-126355 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2026-126355: hono CSRF — Fixed in 4.13.16