Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-84363 — hono

MEDIUMFix: honojs/hono@9c28d72

CVE-2026-84363 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) CWE-444 vulnerability in hono. A fix is available for hono — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials

Also known asGHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-84363.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs38th percentile — riskier than 38% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.32%0.63%0.95%0.4%0.4%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-84363 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

6Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
hononpm
48.0Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Hono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a ? appearing after a # is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.

Details

A fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first # onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.

For one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:

  • A component in front of the application that inspects the query string — filtering rules, parameter allow/deny lists, access logging — observes no parameters, while the application reads and acts on them.
  • The cache middleware removed the fragment when building its cache key, so a response influenced by parameters carried inside the fragment could be stored under a key that did not reflect them and later returned to other users.

The same divergence reaches request validation and any middleware that reads query parameters.

This requires a request target containing a literal # to reach the application. Deployments on runtimes that normalise such a target — including Cloudflare Workers — are not affected, and neither are those behind an intermediary that strips the fragment.

Impact

An attacker can cause the application to act on parameters that components in front of it never observe.

This may lead to:

  • filtering rules, allow/deny lists, and audit logging being blind to parameters the application still processes
  • a cached response being stored under a key that does not reflect the parameters used to produce it, and served to other users
  • stored cross-site scripting, where such a parameter is reflected into a cached HTML response without escaping

This issue affects applications that read query parameters and run on a runtime that passes a literal # through to the request URL.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhonoall versions4.13.5npm install hono@4.13.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update hono to 4.13.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-84363 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Hono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a `?` appearing after a `#` is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see. ### Details A fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, `new URL()`, reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first `#` onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not. For one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential: - A component in front
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-84363 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-84363: hono XSS — Fixed in 4.13.5