Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
HIGHFix: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev#4199GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in trigger.dev. A fix is available for trigger.dev — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
trigger.devnpmDescription
Summary
The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's friendlyId.
Details
Vulnerable file: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts
The loader (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:
export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) {
const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check
const userId = user.id;
// ... queries scoped to user's orgs
}
The action (line 166-193) — NO authentication:
export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => {
const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params);
// ✗ NO requireUser() call
// ✗ NO requireUserId() call
// ✗ NO org membership check
const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({
where: {
friendlyId: runParam, // Queries ANY run, no org scoping
},
include: {
runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } },
project: { include: { organization: true } },
},
});
// ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment
const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService();
The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by friendlyId only — no userId or organization filter. The ReplayTaskRunService then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets.
Same bug class exists in: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts (line 17) — the action has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID.
PoC
Run replay IDOR:
# Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run
POST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
environmentId=<victim-env-id>&failedRedirect=/
The friendlyId values (e.g., run_abc123def) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated.
Batch completion (same bug class):
# Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch
POST /resources/batches/<batchId>/check-completion
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
redirectUrl=/
Impact
- Cross-organization task execution: An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys
- Secret exposure: Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets
- Resource consumption: Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks
- Data integrity: The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues
- Low attack complexity:
friendlyIdvalues are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | trigger.dev | all versions | 4.5.2npm install trigger.dev@4.5.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for trigger.dev, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update trigger.dev to 4.5.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.