Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q

HIGHFix: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev#4199

GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in trigger.dev. A fix is available for trigger.dev — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

1other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
trigger.devnpm
548Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's friendlyId.

Details

Vulnerable file: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts

The loader (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:

export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) {
  const user = await requireUser(request);  // ✓ Auth check
  const userId = user.id;
  // ... queries scoped to user's orgs
}

The action (line 166-193) — NO authentication:

export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => {
  const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params);
  // ✗ NO requireUser() call
  // ✗ NO requireUserId() call
  // ✗ NO org membership check

  const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({
    where: {
      friendlyId: runParam,  // Queries ANY run, no org scoping
    },
    include: {
      runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } },
      project: { include: { organization: true } },
    },
  });

  // ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment
  const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService();

The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by friendlyId only — no userId or organization filter. The ReplayTaskRunService then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets.

Same bug class exists in: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts (line 17) — the action has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID.

PoC

Run replay IDOR:

# Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run
POST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

environmentId=<victim-env-id>&failedRedirect=/

The friendlyId values (e.g., run_abc123def) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated.

Batch completion (same bug class):

# Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch
POST /resources/batches/<batchId>/check-completion
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

redirectUrl=/

Impact

  • Cross-organization task execution: An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys
  • Secret exposure: Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets
  • Resource consumption: Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks
  • Data integrity: The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues
  • Low attack complexity: friendlyId values are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmtrigger.devall versions4.5.2npm install trigger.dev@4.5.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for trigger.dev, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update trigger.dev to 4.5.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The run replay `action` function at `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` has no authentication or authorization check. While the `loader` (GET) in the same file properly calls `requireUser(request)` and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the `action` (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's `friendlyId`. ### Details **Vulnerable file:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` **The `loader` (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:** `
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action…