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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2025-21620 — deno_fetch

HIGH

CVE-2025-21620 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in deno_fetch. A fix is available for deno_fetch — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Deno's authorization headers not dropped when redirecting cross-origin

Also known asGHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
2 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-21620.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.68%1.02%0.2%0.5%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🦀deno_fetch🦀deno🦀deno

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When you send a request with the Authorization header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno'sfetch() redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original Authorization header, leaking its content to that second domain.

Details

The right behavior would be to drop the Authorization header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to Cookie and Proxy-Authorization headers, and is done for not only host changes, but also protocol/port changes. Generally referred to as "origin".

The documentation states:

Deno does not follow the same-origin policy, because the Deno user agent currently does not have the concept of origins, and it does not have a cookie jar. This means Deno does not need to protect against leaking authenticated data cross origin

Reproduction

const ac = new AbortController()

const server1 = Deno.serve({ port: 3001, signal: ac.signal }, (req) => {
  return new Response(null, {
    status: 302,
    headers: {
      'location': 'http://localhost:3002/redirected'
    },
  })
})

const server2 = Deno.serve({ port: 3002, signal: ac.signal }, (req) => {
  const body = JSON.stringify({
    url: req.url,
    hasAuth: req.headers.has('authorization'),
  })
  return new Response(body, {
    status: 200,
    headers: {'content-type': 'application/json'},
  })
})

async function main() {
  const response = await fetch("http://localhost:3001/", {
    headers: {authorization: 'Bearer foo'}
  })
  const body = await response.json()
  
  ac.abort()
  
  if (body.hasAuth) {
    console.error('ERROR: Authorization header should not be present after cross-origin redirect')
  } else {
    console.log('SUCCESS: Authorization header is not present after cross-origin redirect')
  }
}

setTimeout(main, 500)

Affected Packages

3 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iodeno_fetch≥ 0.0.1&&< 0.204.00.204.0cargo update -p deno_fetch --precise 0.204.0
🦀crates.iodenoall versionsNo fix
🦀crates.iodeno≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.1.22.1.2cargo update -p deno --precise 2.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for deno_fetch, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update deno_fetch to 0.204.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-21620 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When you send a request with the `Authorization` header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno's`fetch()` redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original `Authorization` header, leaking its content to that second domain. ### Details The [right behavior](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#ref-for-cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name) would be to drop the `Authorization` header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to `Cookie` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers, and is done for not only host change
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-21620 in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2025-21620: deno_fetch — Fixed in 0.204.0