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GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6

HIGH

fetch: Authorization headers not dropped when redirecting cross-origin

Also known asCVE-2025-21620
Published
Jan 6, 2025
Updated
Jan 7, 2025
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
2 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk39th percentile+0.23%
0.00%0.33%0.66%1.00%0.2%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🦀deno_fetch🦀deno🦀deno

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When you send a request with the Authorization header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno'sfetch() redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original Authorization header, leaking its content to that second domain.

Details

The right behavior would be to drop the Authorization header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to Cookie and Proxy-Authorization headers, and is done for not only host changes, but also protocol/port changes. Generally referred to as "origin".

The documentation states:

Deno does not follow the same-origin policy, because the Deno user agent currently does not have the concept of origins, and it does not have a cookie jar. This means Deno does not need to protect against leaking authenticated data cross origin

Reproduction

const ac = new AbortController()

const server1 = Deno.serve({ port: 3001, signal: ac.signal }, (req) => {
  return new Response(null, {
    status: 302,
    headers: {
      'location': 'http://localhost:3002/redirected'
    },
  })
})

const server2 = Deno.serve({ port: 3002, signal: ac.signal }, (req) => {
  const body = JSON.stringify({
    url: req.url,
    hasAuth: req.headers.has('authorization'),
  })
  return new Response(body, {
    status: 200,
    headers: {'content-type': 'application/json'},
  })
})

async function main() {
  const response = await fetch("http://localhost:3001/", {
    headers: {authorization: 'Bearer foo'}
  })
  const body = await response.json()
  
  ac.abort()
  
  if (body.hasAuth) {
    console.error('ERROR: Authorization header should not be present after cross-origin redirect')
  } else {
    console.log('SUCCESS: Authorization header is not present after cross-origin redirect')
  }
}

setTimeout(main, 500)

Affected Packages

3 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iodeno_fetch0.0.1&&< 0.204.00.204.0
🦀crates.iodenoall versionsNo fix
🦀crates.iodeno2.0.0&&< 2.1.22.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for deno_fetch. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update deno_fetch to 0.204.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When you send a request with the `Authorization` header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno's`fetch()` redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original `Authorization` header, leaking its content to that second domain. ### Details The [right behavior](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#ref-for-cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name) would be to drop the `Authorization` header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to `Cookie` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers, and is done for not only host change
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.