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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2024-45311 — quinn-proto

HIGHFix: quinn-rs/quinn@e01609c

CVE-2024-45311 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-670 vulnerability in quinn-proto. A fix is available for quinn-proto — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`

Also known asGHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8RUSTSEC-2024-0373
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-45311.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs47th percentile — riskier than 47% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.07%0.40%0.74%1.08%0.6%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀quinn-proto

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to accept(), retry(), refuse(), or ignore() an Incoming connection. However, calling retry() on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations:

  • Calling refuse or ignore on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received
    • This issue can go undetected until a server's refuse()/ignore() code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack.
  • Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received.
    • This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved.

The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Details

Location of panic: https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/blob/bb02a12a8435a7732a1d762783eeacbb7e50418e/quinn-proto/src/endpoint.rs#L213

Impact

Denial of service for internet-facing server

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioquinn-proto≥ 0.11.0&&< 0.11.70.11.7cargo update -p quinn-proto --precise 0.11.7

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
quinnquinn_project
≥ 0.11.0 && < 0.11.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for quinn-proto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update quinn-proto to 0.11.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-45311 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: - Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received - This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. - Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-45311 in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2024-45311: quinn-proto DoS — Fixed in 0.11.7