NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2024-42480 — kamaji

HIGHFix: clastix/kamaji@1731e8c

CVE-2024-42480 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-284 vulnerability in github.com/clastix/kamaji. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Kamaji's RBAC Roles for `etcd` are not disjunct

Also known asGHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5GO-2024-3063
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 2, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-42480.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs50th percentile — riskier than 50% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.37%0.75%1.12%0.4%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/clastix/kamaji

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Using an "open at the top" range definition in RBAC for etcd roles leads to some TCPs API servers being able to read, write and delete the data of other control planes.

Details

The problematic code is this: https://github.com/clastix/kamaji/blob/8cdc6191242f80d120c46b166e2102d27568225a/internal/datastore/etcd.go#L19-L24

The range created by this RBAC setup code looks like this:

etcdctl role get example
Role example
KV Read:
	[/example/, \0)
KV Write:
	[/example/, \0)

The range end \0 means "everything that comes after" in etcd, so potentially all the key prefixes of controlplanes with a name that comes after "example" when sorting lexically (e.g. example1, examplf, all the way to zzzzzzz if you will).

PoC

  1. Create two TCP in the same Namespace
  2. Scale Kamaji to zero to avoid reconciliations
  3. change the Kubernetes API Server --etcd-prefix flag value to point to the other TCP datastore key
  4. wait it for get it up and running
  5. use kubectl and will notice you're reading and writing data of another Tenant

Impact

Full control over other TCPs data, if you are able to obtain the name of other TCPs that use the same datastore and are able to obtain the user certificates used by your control plane (or you are able to configure the kube-apiserver Deployment, as shown in the PoC).

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/clastix/kamajiall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
kamajiclastix
< edge-24.8.2
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/clastix/kamaji, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of github.com/clastix/kamaji for CVE-2024-42480. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary _Using an "open at the top" range definition in RBAC for etcd roles leads to some TCPs API servers being able to read, write and delete the data of other control planes._ ### Details The problematic code is this: https://github.com/clastix/kamaji/blob/8cdc6191242f80d120c46b166e2102d27568225a/internal/datastore/etcd.go#L19-L24 The range created by this RBAC setup code looks like this: ``` etcdctl role get example Role example KV Read: [/example/, \0) KV Write: [/example/, \0) ``` The range end `\0` means "everything that comes after" in etcd, so potentially all the key prefix
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-42480 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2024-42480: kamaji (High 8.1)