GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-284 vulnerability in github.com/clastix/kamaji. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
RBAC Roles for `etcd` created by Kamaji are not disjunct
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/clastix/kamajiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Using an "open at the top" range definition in RBAC for etcd roles leads to some TCPs API servers being able to read, write and delete the data of other control planes.
Details
The problematic code is this: https://github.com/clastix/kamaji/blob/8cdc6191242f80d120c46b166e2102d27568225a/internal/datastore/etcd.go#L19-L24
The range created by this RBAC setup code looks like this:
etcdctl role get example
Role example
KV Read:
[/example/, \0)
KV Write:
[/example/, \0)
The range end \0 means "everything that comes after" in etcd, so potentially all the key prefixes of controlplanes with a name that comes after "example" when sorting lexically (e.g. example1, examplf, all the way to zzzzzzz if you will).
PoC
- Create two TCP in the same Namespace
- Scale Kamaji to zero to avoid reconciliations
- change the Kubernetes API Server
--etcd-prefixflag value to point to the other TCP datastore key - wait it for get it up and running
- use
kubectland will notice you're reading and writing data of another Tenant
Impact
Full control over other TCPs data, if you are able to obtain the name of other TCPs that use the same datastore and are able to obtain the user certificates used by your control plane (or you are able to configure the kube-apiserver Deployment, as shown in the PoC).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/clastix/kamaji | all versions | No fix |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/clastix/kamaji, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/clastix/kamaji has shipped for GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.