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HIGH severity

CVE-2024-34347 @hoppscotch/cli

HIGHFix: hoppscotch/hoppscotch@22c6eab

CVE-2024-34347 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) CWE-77 vulnerability in @hoppscotch/cli. A fix is available for @hoppscotch/cli — see the affected versions and patch details below.

@hoppscotch/cli affected by Sandbox Escape in @hoppscotch/js-sandbox leads to RCE

Also known asGHSA-qmmm-73r2-f8xr
Published
May 8, 2024
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-34347.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs48th percentile — riskier than 48% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2024-34347 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@hoppscotch/clinpm
4Kdownloads / week

Description

Observations

The Hoppscotch desktop app takes multiple precautions to be secure against arbitrary JavaScript and system command execution. It does not render user-controlled HTML or Markdown, uses Tauri instead of Electron, and sandboxes pre-request scripts with a simple yet secure implementation using web workers.

Unfortunately, web workers are not available in a pure Node.js application like Hoppscotch CLI. That is why the @hoppscotch/js-sandbox package also provides a Javascript sandbox that uses the Node.js vm module. However, the vm module is not safe for sandboxing untrusted Javascript code, as stated in the documentation. This is because code inside the vm context can break out if it can get a hold of any reference to an object created outside of the vm.

In the case of @hoppscotch/js-sandbox, multiple references to external objects are passed into the vm context to allow pre-request scripts interactions with environment variables and more. But this also allows the pre-request script to escape the sandbox. packages/hoppscotch-js-sandbox/src/pre-request/node-vm/index.ts

const { pw, updatedEnvs } = getPreRequestScriptMethods(envs)

// Expose pw to the context
context.pw = pw
context.atob = atob
context.btoa = btoa

// Run the pre-request script in the provided context
runInContext(preRequestScript, context)

Exploitation

An attacker can use the exposed pw object reference to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands using the child_process Node.js module. This PoC pre-request script executes the id > /tmp/pwnd system command as soon as a request is sent.

outside = pw.constructor.constructor('return this')()
outside.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id > /tmp/pwnd')

An attacker who wants to run arbitrary code on the machine of a victim can create a Hoppscotch collection containing a request with a malicious pre-request script and share it with a victim, using the JSON export feature. The victim then has to run the collection with the Hoppscotch CLI. Then the malicious pre-request script executes.

Impact

This attack gives an attacker arbitrary command execution on the machine of a victim Hoppscotch CLI user. For the attack to succeed, an attacker has to lure the victim into downloading a malicious Hoppscotch collection and running it with the Hoppscotch CLI.

This issue does not impact Hoppscotch Web or Desktop, as they use the safe web worker sandboxing approach.

Recommendations

Hoppscotch CLI and other tools that rely on @hoppscotch/js-sandbox but don't have access to a browser cannot use the web worker sandbox. For these, you can look into other safe JavaScript sandboxing libraries. We think that isolated-vm looks promising. We discourage the use of vm2, which is deprecated because it has arbitrary bypasses. Alternatively, you can introduce an --enable-scripting flag for the CLI and disable scripting by default. Or you can change the threat model and educate users that they should not run untrusted collections as it can lead to RCE.

Differences from existing CVEs

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@hoppscotch/cli0.5.0&&< 0.8.00.8.0npm install @hoppscotch/cli@0.8.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @hoppscotch/cli, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @hoppscotch/cli to 0.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-34347 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2024-34347 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2024-34347. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Observations The Hoppscotch desktop app takes multiple precautions to be secure against arbitrary JavaScript and system command execution. It does not render user-controlled HTML or Markdown, uses Tauri instead of Electron, and sandboxes pre-request scripts with a simple yet secure implementation using web workers. Unfortunately, web workers are not available in a pure Node.js application like Hoppscotch CLI. That is why the [@hoppscotch/js-sandbox](https://github.com/hoppscotch/hoppscotch/tree/main/packages/hoppscotch-js-sandbox) package also provides a Javascript sandbox that uses the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-34347 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2024-34347 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2024-34347: @hoppscotch/cli (High 8.3) | O3 Security