CVE-2026-102827 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-77 vulnerability in simple-git. A fix is available for simple-git — see the affected versions and patch details below.
simple-git: unsafe-operations plugin bypass via git long-option abbreviation (--receive-p/--exe) -> command execution (residual of CVE-2026-28291)
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-102827.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-102827 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 384,534 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
simple-gitReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
simple-git's blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin blocks dangerous git options (--upload-pack/--receive-pack/--exec/...) unless the consumer opts in via unsafe:{allowUnsafePack:true}. Detection (@simple-git/argv-parser detectVulnerableFlags) matches the parsed flag NAME against literal-spelling patterns: /--(upload|receive)-pack/ (requires the literal '-pack') and the string '--exec'. But git accepts unambiguous prefix abbreviations of long options, and expandToken (token-expander.ts) returns the LITERAL token as flag.name (it uses the spec only for needsNext, never to canonicalize). So git push --receive-p=<cmd> parses with flag.name='--receive-p', which /--(upload|receive)-pack/ does NOT match, yet git expands --receive-p -> --receive-pack and runs <cmd> (on a local/file remote, locally). The clone side is robust (its '--u' substring rule catches every --upload* abbreviation); the push --receive-* and --exe* abbreviations have no equivalent rule and slip through.
Proof of concept (latest: simple-git 3.36.0, @simple-git/argv-parser 1.1.1, default unsafe plugin ON):
Gate vulnerabilityCheck: 'push --receive-pack=touch...' -> BLOCKED; 'push --receive-pa=touch...' and 'push --receive-p=touch...' -> BYPASS (empty vulns); '--exec=' BLOCKED, '--exe=' BYPASS.
End-to-end via simpleGit().push():
CONTROL git.push(['../bare','HEAD:refs/heads/c','--receive-pack=touch /tmp/pwned_ctrl;']) -> throws GitPluginError 'Use of --upload-pack or --receive-pack is not permitted...'; no command runs.
BYPASS git.push(['../bare','HEAD:refs/heads/e2e','--receive-p=touch /tmp/pwned_e2e;']) -> NO GitPluginError; /tmp/pwned_e2e CREATED (git executed the injected command); only a later GitError surfaces.
Direct git confirms git push ../bare --receive-p='touch X;' HEAD:refs/heads/m and --exe='touch Y;' both execute on a local/path remote.
Impact: any app relying on simple-git's default unsafe-operations protection while passing attacker-influenced options/args into a git push (local/file remote, or attacker-influenced receive-pack target) can be made to execute arbitrary commands -- the exact protection CVE-2026-28291 provided, defeated by an abbreviated spelling. Same class/impact as GHSA-jcxm-m3jx-f287, on the push path.
Remediation: canonicalize git option abbreviations before matching (resolve to the canonical long name via the per-task flag spec in expandToken), or match on the option stem/prefix down to the shortest unambiguous form for push receive-pack/exec (mirroring the clone-side '--u' approach). Also audit --template and -c/config-write detection for the same abbreviation gap.
Credit: anir0y (independent security research).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | simple-git | all versions | 4.0.0npm install simple-git@4.0.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for simple-git, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update simple-git to 4.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-102827 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-102827 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.