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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2023-30629 — vyper

HIGHFix: vyperlang/vyper@851f7a1

CVE-2023-30629 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-670 vulnerability in vyper. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for vyper — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Vyper's raw_call with outsize=0 and revert_on_failure=False returns incorrect success value

Also known asGHSA-w9g2-3w7p-72g9PYSEC-2023-131
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-30629.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs59th percentile — riskier than 59% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.46%0.92%1.38%0.3%0.9%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍vyper

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Background

During the audit of Lido's Gate Seals code statemind team identified a weird behavior of the code that uses raw_call: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/blob/051593e74df01a4131c485b4fda52e691cd4b7d8/contracts/GateSeal.vy#L164 .

Construction like this:

success = raw_call(
    sealable,
    _abi_encode(SEAL_DURATION_SECONDS, method_id=method_id("pauseFor(uint256)")),
    revert_on_failure=False
)

was not fully documented: https://docs.vyperlang.org/en/v0.3.7/built-in-functions.html#raw_call .

The documentation says that: if max_outsize=0 it should return nothing and then it says that if revert_on_failure=False it should return a success flag in the tuple of response, but what if max_outsize=0 and revert_on_failure=False.

<img width="715" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/22330612/232125364-d2b3bbac-0b4f-40cb-80ff-f55d8eafef44.png">

So the team started researching what exactly happened in that case, after some research we found that the Vyper compiler generates the wrong bytecode in that case, it generates the sequence:

CALL // call
MLOAD // MLOAD is wrong since the CALL result is already stored in the stack

Impact

Example of buggy code:

@external
def returnSome(calling: address, a: uint256) -> bool:
    success: bool = false
    success = raw_call(
        calling,
        _abi_encode(a, method_id=method_id("a(uint256)")),
        revert_on_failure=False
        )

any contract that uses the raw_call with revert_on_failure=False and max_outsize=0 receives the wrong response from raw_call. Depending on the memory garbage, the result can be either True or False.

Patches

Fix by @charles-cooper https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/851f7a1b3aa2a36fd041e3d0ed38f9355a58c8ae

Workarounds

The simple workaround is always to put max_outsize>0. Workaround example https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files

References

Lido's fix: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIvyper≥ 0.3.1&&< 0.3.80.3.8pip install --upgrade 'vyper==0.3.8'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
vypervyperlang
≥ 0.3.1 && < 0.3.8
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vyper, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update vyper to 0.3.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-30629 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Background During the audit of [Lido's Gate Seals](https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals) code [statemind](https://statemind.io) team identified a weird behavior of the code that uses `raw_call`: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/blob/051593e74df01a4131c485b4fda52e691cd4b7d8/contracts/GateSeal.vy#L164 . Construction like this: ```vyper success = raw_call( sealable, _abi_encode(SEAL_DURATION_SECONDS, method_id=method_id("pauseFor(uint256)")), revert_on_failure=False ) ``` was not fully documented: https://docs.vyperlang.org/en/v0.3.7/built-in-functions.html#raw_call
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2023-30629 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2023-30629: vyper — Fixed in 0.3.8