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CVE-2022-35924 — next-auth

CRITICALFix: nextauthjs/next-auth@afb1fcd

CVE-2022-35924 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in next-auth. A fix is available for next-auth — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Verification requests (magic link) sent to unwanted emails

Also known asGHSA-xv97-c62v-4587
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2022-35924.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs72th percentile — riskier than 72% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.64%1.29%1.93%0.4%1.4%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2022-35924 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 384,189 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

599other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
next-authnpm
7.8Mdownloads / week

Description

Impact

next-auth users who are using the EmailProvider either in versions before 4.10.3 or 3.29.10 are affected.

If an attacker could forge a request that sent a comma-separated list of emails (eg.: [email protected],[email protected]) to the sign-in endpoint, NextAuth.js would send emails to both the attacker and the victim's e-mail addresses. The attacker could then login as a newly created user with the email being [email protected],[email protected]. This means that basic authorization like email.endsWith("@victim.com") in the signIn callback would fail to communicate a threat to the developer and would let the attacker bypass authorization, even with an @attacker.com address.

Patches

We patched this vulnerability in v4.10.3 and v3.29.10 by normalizing the email value that is sent to the sign-in endpoint before accessing it anywhere else. We also added a normalizeIdentifier callback on the EmailProvider configuration, where you can further tweak your requirements for what your system considers a valid e-mail address. (E.g.: strict RFC2821 compliance)

To upgrade, run one of the following:

npm i next-auth@latest
yarn add next-auth@latest
pnpm add next-auth@latest

(This will update to the latest v4 version, but you can change latest to 3 if you want to stay on v3. This is not recommended. v3 is unmaintained.)

Workarounds

If for some reason you cannot upgrade, you can normalize the incoming request like the following, using Advanced Initialization:

// pages/api/auth/[...nextauth].ts

function normalize(identifier) {
  // Get the first two elements only,
  // separated by `@` from user input.
  let [local, domain] = identifier.toLowerCase().trim().split("@")
  // The part before "@" can contain a ","
  // but we remove it on the domain part
  domain = domain.split(",")[0]
  return `${local}@${domain}`
}

export default async function handler(req, res) {
  if (req.body.email) req.body.email = normalize(req.body.email)
  return await NextAuth(req, res, {/* your options */ })
}

References

For more information

If you have any concerns, we request responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://next-auth.js.org/security#reporting-a-vulnerability

Timeline

The issue was reported 26th of July, a response was sent out in less than 1 hour and after identifying the issue a patch was published within 5 working days.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Socket for disclosing this vulnerability in a responsible manner and following up until it got published.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmnext-auth≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.10.34.10.3npm install next-auth@4.10.3
📦npmnext-authall versions3.29.10npm install next-auth@3.29.10

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
next-authnextauth.js
≥ 4.0.0 && < 4.10.3
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for next-auth, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update next-auth to 4.10.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2022-35924 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact `next-auth` users who are using the `EmailProvider` either in versions before `4.10.3` or `3.29.10` are affected. If an attacker could forge a request that sent a comma-separated list of emails (eg.: `[email protected],[email protected]`) to the sign-in endpoint, NextAuth.js would send emails to both the attacker and the victim's e-mail addresses. The attacker could then login as a newly created user with the email being `[email protected],[email protected]`. This means that basic authorization like `email.endsWith("@victim.com")` in the `signIn` callback would fail to comm
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2022-35924 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2022-35924: next-auth — Fixed in 4.10.3