GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587
CRITICALNextAuth.js before 4.10.3 and 3.29.10 sending verification requests (magic link) to unwanted emails
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
next-auth📦next-authReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
next-auth users who are using the EmailProvider either in versions before 4.10.3 or 3.29.10 are affected.
If an attacker could forge a request that sent a comma-separated list of emails (eg.: [email protected],[email protected]) to the sign-in endpoint, NextAuth.js would send emails to both the attacker and the victim's e-mail addresses. The attacker could then login as a newly created user with the email being [email protected],[email protected]. This means that basic authorization like email.endsWith("@victim.com") in the signIn callback would fail to communicate a threat to the developer and would let the attacker bypass authorization, even with an @attacker.com address.
Patches
We patched this vulnerability in v4.10.3 and v3.29.10 by normalizing the email value that is sent to the sign-in endpoint before accessing it anywhere else. We also added a normalizeIdentifier callback on the EmailProvider configuration, where you can further tweak your requirements for what your system considers a valid e-mail address. (E.g.: strict RFC2821 compliance)
To upgrade, run one of the following:
npm i next-auth@latest
yarn add next-auth@latest
pnpm add next-auth@latest
(This will update to the latest v4 version, but you can change latest to 3 if you want to stay on v3. This is not recommended. v3 is unmaintained.)
Workarounds
If for some reason you cannot upgrade, you can normalize the incoming request like the following, using Advanced Initialization:
// pages/api/auth/[...nextauth].ts
function normalize(identifier) {
// Get the first two elements only,
// separated by `@` from user input.
let [local, domain] = identifier.toLowerCase().trim().split("@")
// The part before "@" can contain a ","
// but we remove it on the domain part
domain = domain.split(",")[0]
return `${local}@${domain}`
}
export default async function handler(req, res) {
if (req.body.email) req.body.email = normalize(req.body.email)
return await NextAuth(req, res, {/* your options */ })
}
References
- EmailProvider: https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email
- Normalize the email address: https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email#normalizing-the-email-address
- Email syntax: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Local-part
signIncallback: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/callbacks#sign-in-callback- Advanced Initialization: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/initialization#advanced-initialization
nodemaileraddress: https://nodemailer.com/message/addresses
For more information
If you have any concerns, we request responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://next-auth.js.org/security#reporting-a-vulnerability
Timeline
The issue was reported 26th of July, a response was sent out in less than 1 hour and after identifying the issue a patch was published within 5 working days.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Socket for disclosing this vulnerability in a responsible manner and following up until it got published.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | next-auth | ≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.10.3 | 4.10.3 |
| 📦npm | next-auth | all versions | 3.29.10 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for next-auth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update next-auth to 4.10.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.