GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f
HIGHThe Eclipse Jetty Server Artifact has a Gzip request memory leak
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server☕org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-serverReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description (as reported)
There is a memory leak when using GzipHandler in jetty-12.0.30 that can cause off-heap OOMs. This can be used for DoS attacks so I'm reporting this as a vulnerability.
The leak is created by requests where the request is inflated (Content-Encoding: gzip) and the response is not deflated (no Accept-Encoding: gzip). In these conditions, a new inflator will be created by GzipRequest and never released back into GzipRequest.__inflaterPool because gzipRequest.destory() is not called.
In heap dumps one can see thousands of java.util.zip.Inflator objects, which use both Java heaps and native memory. Leaking native memory causes of off-heap OOMs.
Code path in GzipHandler.handle():
- Line 601:
GzipRequestis created when request inflation is needed. - Lines 611-616: The callback is only wrapped in
GzipResponseAndCallbackwhen both inflation and deflation are needed. - Lines 619-625: If the handler accepts the request (returns true),
gzipRequest.destroy()is only called in the "request not accepted" path (returns false)
When deflation is needed, GzipResponseAndCallback (lines 102 and 116) properly calls gzipRequest.destroy() in its succeeded() and failed() methods. But this wrapper is only created when deflation is needed.
Possible fix:
The callback should be wrapped whenever a GzipRequest is created, not just when deflation is needed. This ensures gzipRequest.destroy() is always called when the request completes.
Impact
The leak causes the JVM to crash with OOME.
Patches
No patches yet.
Workarounds
Disable GzipHandler.
References
https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/issues/14260
https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/issues/79
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | ≥ 12.1.0&&< 12.1.6 | 12.1.6 |
| ☕Maven | org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | ≥ 12.0.0&&< 12.0.32 | 12.0.32 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server to 12.1.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.