GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24
LOWStudioCMS REST getUsers Exposes Owner Account Records to Admin Tokens
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
studiocmsnpmDescription
Summary
The REST API getUsers endpoint in StudioCMS uses the attacker-controlled rank query parameter to decide whether owner accounts should be filtered from the result set. As a result, an admin token can request rank=owner and receive owner account records, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses, even though the adjacent getUser endpoint correctly blocks admins from viewing owner users. This is an authorization inconsistency inside the same user-management surface.
Details
Vulnerable Code Path
File: D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts, lines 1605-1647
.handle(
'getUsers',
Effect.fn(
function* ({ urlParams: { name, rank, username } }) {
if (!restAPIEnabled) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Endpoint not found' });
}
const [sdk, user] = yield* Effect.all([SDKCore, CurrentRestAPIUser]);
if (user.rank !== 'owner' && user.rank !== 'admin') {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
const allUsers = yield* sdk.GET.users.all();
let data = allUsers.map(...);
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}
if (rank) {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank === rank);
}
return data;
},
The rank variable in if (rank !== 'owner') is the request query parameter, not the caller's privilege level. An admin can therefore pass rank=owner, skip the owner-filtering branch, and then have the second if (rank) branch return only owner accounts.
Adjacent Endpoint Shows Intended Security Boundary
File: D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts, lines 1650-1710
const existingUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(existingUserRank);
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);
if (loggedInUserRankIndex <= existingUserRankIndex) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({
error: 'Unauthorized to view user with higher rank',
});
}
getUser correctly blocks an admin from viewing an owner record. getUsers bypasses that boundary for bulk enumeration.
Sensitive Fields Returned
The getUsers response includes:
idemailnameusernamerank- timestamps and profile URL/avatar fields when present
This is enough to enumerate all owner accounts and target them for phishing, social engineering, or follow-on attacks against out-of-band workflows.
PoC
HTTP PoC
Use any admin-level REST API token:
curl -X GET 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/rest/v1/secure/users?rank=owner' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-api-token>'
Expected behavior:
- owner records should be excluded for admin callers, consistent with
getUser
Actual behavior:
- the response contains owner user objects, including email addresses and user IDs
Local Validation of the Exact Handler Logic
I validated the filtering logic locally with the same conditions used by getUsers and getUser.
Observed output:
{
"admin_getUsers_rank_owner": [
{
"email": "[email protected]",
"id": "owner-1",
"name": "Site Owner",
"rank": "owner",
"username": "owner1"
}
],
"admin_getUser_owner": "Unauthorized to view user with higher rank"
}
This demonstrates the authorization mismatch clearly:
- bulk listing with
rank=ownerexposes owner records - direct access to a single owner record is denied
Impact
- Owner Account Enumeration: Admin tokens can recover owner user IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses.
- Authorization Boundary Bypass: The REST collection endpoint bypasses the stricter per-record rank check already implemented by
getUser. - Chaining Value: Exposed owner contact data can support phishing, account-targeting, and admin-to-owner pivot attempts in deployments that treat owner identities as higher-trust principals.
Recommended Fix
Apply rank filtering based on the caller's role, not on the request query parameter, and reuse the same privilege rule as getUser.
Example fix:
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);
data = data.filter((candidate) => {
const candidateRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(candidate.rank);
return loggedInUserRankIndex > candidateRankIndex;
});
if (rank) {
data = data.filter((candidate) => candidate.rank === rank);
}
At minimum, replace:
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}
with a check tied to user.rank rather than the query parameter.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | studiocms | all versions | 0.4.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for studiocms. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update studiocms to 0.4.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.