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📦 npm

GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9

MEDIUM

NocoDB has Blind SSRF via Unvalidated HEAD Request in uploadViaURL Functionality

Also known asCVE-2026-24767
Published
Jan 28, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk10th percentile+0.18%
0.00%0.23%0.47%0.70%0.0%0.2%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

nocodbnpm
3Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the uploadViaURL functionality due to an unprotected HEAD request. While the subsequent file retrieval logic correctly enforces SSRF protections, the initial metadata request executes without validation.

This allows limited outbound requests to arbitrary URLs before SSRF controls are applied.


Vulnerability Details

The uploadViaURL() function issues an axios.head() request to retrieve metadata (content type, content length, and final URL after redirects). This request is performed without SSRF filtering.

Although the actual file download is protected by request filtering, the initial HEAD request occurs prior to these checks and can be triggered with an attacker-controlled URL.

Vulnerable Code

if (!url.startsWith('data:')) {
  response = await axios.head(url, { maxRedirects: 5 });
  mimeType = response.headers['content-type']?.split(';')[0];
  size = response.headers['content-length'];
  finalUrl = response.request.res.responseUrl;
}

Impact

The impact of this issue is limited due to the following constraints:

  • Only HEAD requests are affected (no response body is returned)
  • No direct exfiltration of response data occurs
  • The subsequent file-fetching logic enforces SSRF protections

However, the vulnerability may still allow:

  • Blind SSRF via outbound HEAD requests
  • Limited internal service probing (reachability and response behavior)
  • Interaction with sensitive internal endpoints that respond to HEAD requests

This issue does not provide arbitrary data access or full internal network compromise on its own.


Severity

Moderate

The vulnerability is limited in scope and impact:

  • Only HEAD requests are affected
  • No response body or sensitive data is directly returned
  • The actual file download logic enforces SSRF protections

While the issue permits blind outbound requests to attacker-controlled URLs, it does not enable direct data exfiltration or full internal network compromise on its own.


Proof of Concept

curl -X POST 'http://localhost:8080/api/v2/storage/upload-by-url' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'xc-auth: <token>' \
  -d '[{
    "url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
    "fileName": "test.txt"
  }]'

This request causes the server to issue an unfiltered HEAD request before SSRF protections are applied.


Acknowledgements

This issue was first identified and responsibly disclosed by Faizan Raza of Kolega.dev as part of a security assessment using Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan, including validation and fix recommendations.

NocoDB also acknowledges Neel B for independently reporting the same issue prior to publication.

NocoDB thanks Kolega.dev for their contribution to improving the security posture of the project.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmnocodball versions0.301.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nocodb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update nocodb to 0.301.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A **blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** vulnerability exists in the `uploadViaURL` functionality due to an unprotected `HEAD` request. While the subsequent file retrieval logic correctly enforces SSRF protections, the initial metadata request executes without validation. This allows limited outbound requests to arbitrary URLs before SSRF controls are applied. --- ## Vulnerability Details The `uploadViaURL()` function issues an `axios.head()` request to retrieve metadata (content type, content length, and final URL after redirects). This request is performed **without SSR
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.