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GHSA-xq59-7jf3-rjc6 — piccolo

CRITICALFix: piccolo-orm/piccolo@82679eb

GHSA-xq59-7jf3-rjc6 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in piccolo. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for piccolo — see the affected versions and patch details below.

piccolo SQL Injection via named transaction savepoints

Also known asCVE-2023-47128PYSEC-2023-241
Published
Nov 12, 2023
Updated
Jun 9, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xq59-7jf3-rjc6.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs54th percentile — riskier than 54% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-xq59-7jf3-rjc6 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍piccolo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The handling of named transaction savepoints in all database implementations is vulnerable to SQL Injection as user provided input is passed directly to connection.execute(...) via f-strings.

Details

An excerpt of the Postgres savepoint handling:

    async def savepoint(self, name: t.Optional[str] = None) -> Savepoint:
        name = name or f"savepoint_{self.get_savepoint_id()}"
        await self.connection.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}")
        return Savepoint(name=name, transaction=self)

In this example, we can see user input is directly passed to connection.execute without being properly escaped.

All implementations of savepoints and savepoint methods directly pass this name parameter to connection.execute and are vulnerable to this. A non-exhaustive list can be found below:

Care should be given to ensuring all strings passed to connection.execute are properly escaped, regardless of how end user facing they may be.

Further to this, the following method also passes user input directly to an execution context however I have been unable to abuse this functionality at the time of writing. This method also has a far lower chance of being exposed to an end user as it relates to database init functionality.

PoC

The following FastAPI route can be used in conjunction with sqlmap to easily demonstrate the SQL injection.

DB = ...

@app.get("/test")
async def test(name):
    async with DB.transaction() as transaction:
        await transaction.savepoint(name)
Steps
  1. Create a standard Piccolo application with Postgres as a database backend
  2. Add the route shown previously
  3. Run your application, making a note of the URL it is served on
  4. Install sqlmap
  5. In a terminal, run the following command substituting URL with your applications URL: sqlmap -u "http://URL/test?name=a" --batch
  6. Observe sqlmap identifying the vulnerability

For sqlmap help, this usage guide may be useful. The following commands may also be helpful to see the impact.

Dumping all tables

The --tables flag will enumerate all tables accessible from within the exposed database session.

sqlmap -u "http://URL/test?name=a" --batch --tables

An example output of this can be seen in the following screenshot. Screenshot from 2023-11-06 23-10-30

OS Shell

The --os-shell will drop the user into an OS shell on the underlying system if permissions permit. This can be seen in the attached screenshot which prints the databases current working directory. Screenshot from 2023-11-06 22-43-50

Impact

While the likelihood of an end developer exposing a savepoints name parameter to a user is highly unlikely, it would not be unheard of. If a malicious user was able to abuse this functionality they would have essentially direct access to the database and the ability to modify data to the level of permissions associated with the database user.

A non exhaustive list of actions possible based on database permissions is:

  • Read all data stored in the database, including usernames and password hashes
  • Insert arbitrary data into the database, including modifying existing records
  • Gain a shell on the underlying server

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpiccoloall versions1.1.1pip install --upgrade 'piccolo==1.1.1'
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for piccolo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update piccolo to 1.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xq59-7jf3-rjc6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Until you can upgrade, make sure every query built from user input uses parameterised statements or a prepared-statement API rather than string concatenation, and reduce the database account's privileges so an injected query cannot read or alter data beyond what the feature needs.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The handling of named transaction savepoints in all database implementations is vulnerable to [SQL Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL_Injection) as user provided input is passed directly to `connection.execute(...)` via f-strings. ### Details An excerpt of the Postgres savepoint handling: ```python async def savepoint(self, name: t.Optional[str] = None) -> Savepoint: name = name or f"savepoint_{self.get_savepoint_id()}" await self.connection.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}") return Savepoint(name=name, transaction=self) ``` In this exam
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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