NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐍 PyPI
Not in CISA KEV

stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants' quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r

Fix: eidetic-labs/stigmem#728

GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r is a CWE-639 vulnerability in stigmem-node. A fix is available for stigmem-node — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-76237
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 30, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.86%0.3%0.4%0.4%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍stigmem-node

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants. The list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked an f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the /v1/quarantine list and admit/reject endpoints.

Impact

Cross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a plain tenant write capability rather than a node-level admin authority.

Affected configurations

This is a cross-tenant break. It is exploitable only on deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only tenant="default" — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is not exploitable on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.

Patches

Fixed in 0.9.0a12 (PR #728): AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id was added to the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind can_admin_federation() (node superadmin), not a tenant write capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A's quarantined facts.

Workarounds

None other than upgrading to 0.9.0a12. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIstigmem-nodeall versions0.9.0a12pip install --upgrade 'stigmem-node==0.9.0a12'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for stigmem-node, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update stigmem-node to 0.9.0a12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and **admit or reject** quarantined facts belonging to **other** tenants. The list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact` in `routes/quarantine.py` lacked an `f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the `/v1/quarantine` list and admit/reject endpoints. ### Impact Cross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a p
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and…