stigmem-node: decay sweep expires and counts facts across all tenants (cross-tenant BOLA)GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m
Fix: eidetic-labs/stigmem#728GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m is a CWE-863 vulnerability in stigmem-node. A fix is available for stigmem-node — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
stigmem-nodeReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a caller holding a write credential for one tenant can run a decay sweep that acts on every tenant's facts. The candidate-selection queries in lifecycle/decay.py (_select_ttl_candidates, _select_confidence_candidates) carried no tenant_id predicate, and the caller's tenant was not threaded into the sweep or its async worker (run_decay_sweep / _decay_job_worker), reached via POST /v1/decay/sweep.
Impact
A sweep with ttl_seconds=0 expires all tenants' facts — cross-tenant data destruction (integrity and availability). A dry_run sweep returns a global candidate count, acting as a cross-tenant existence/volume oracle (information disclosure).
Affected configurations
This is a cross-tenant break. It is exploitable only on deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only tenant="default" — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is not exploitable on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.
Patches
Fixed in 0.9.0a12 (PR #728): identity.tenant_id is threaded into run_decay_sweep and _decay_job_worker, and AND tenant_id = ? was added to the candidate selectors and the graph-sync. A tenant-B sweep now leaves tenant-A facts untouched, and dry_run counts only the caller's tenant. The check_fact_query_tenant_scope.py CI guard was extended to scan lifecycle/ so this class cannot silently regress.
Workarounds
None other than upgrading to 0.9.0a12. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | stigmem-node | all versions | 0.9.0a12pip install --upgrade 'stigmem-node==0.9.0a12' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for stigmem-node, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update stigmem-node to 0.9.0a12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.